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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, constitutional issues involving the military
chaplaincy have progressed from a low simmer to a rolling boil. After decades
of little public attention, stories about the chaplaincy regularly reach the national
news, 23cases proliferate in the courts,3 and new scholarly articles on the subject
appear regularly.4 The stories and lawsuits cover a wide array of legal ques2

Alan Cooperman, For Gods and Country: The Army Chaplain Who Wanted to Switch to

Wicca? Transfer Denied, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2007, at Cl; Neela Bannerjee, Proposalon Military Chaplains and Prayer Holds Up Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A19; Sonja Barisic,
Navy Chaplain Guilty of Wearing Uniform at Protest, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 14, 2006; Alan
Cooperman, Military Wrestles with Disharmony Among Chaplains,WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2005,
at Al; Laurie Goodstein, EvangelicalsAre Growing Force In the Military Chaplain Corps, N. Y.
TIMES, July 12, 2005, at Al.
3
Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v.
England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In re England, 375 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005); Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2007); Weinstein
v. U.S. Air Force, 468 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (D.N.M. 2006); Adair v. England, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2006); Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 346 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2004).
4
David E. Fitzkee & Linell A. Letendre, Religion in the Military: Navigating the Channel
Between the Religion Clauses, 59 A.F. L. REV. 1 (2007); Richard D. Rosen, Katcoff v. Marsh at
Twenty-Two: The Military Chaplaincy and the Separation of Church and State, 38 U. TOL. L.
REv. 1137 (2007); William J. Dobosh, Jr., Coercion in the Ranks: The Establishment Clause
Implications of Chaplain-Led Prayers at Mandatory Army Events, 2006 WISc. L. REv. 1493;
Heather Cook, Service Before Self? Evangelicals Flying High at the U.S. Air Force Academy, 36
J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2007); Frank J. Ducoat, New Development, Self-Executing IrreparableHarm:
Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England ("England I"), 8 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIG. 8
(2006); Kenneth J. Schweiker, Note, Military Chaplains: Federally Funded Fanaticism and the
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tions, from discrimination in the selection and promotion of chaplains, 5 to constraints on the conduct of chaplains' ministry,6 to the constitutionality of the
chaplaincy itself.7 Legal analysis of these issues has thus far proved somewhat
problematic because the military chaplaincy occupies a highly unusual position
in constitutional law.
Consider the basic structure of the military chaplaincy. The government
establishes professional standards for eligible clergy 8 and decides which chaplains should be hired, promoted and discharged. 9 Chaplains engage in government-funded worship, religious instruction and pastoral counseling. 0 Moreover, the government builds the houses of worship in which chaplains conduct
religious services, pays for hymnals and liturgical supplies and provides the
materials for religious instruction." These kinds of expenditures and employment decisions represent the core features of any definition of an "establishment

United States Air Force Academy, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIG. 5 (2006); Steven H. Aden, The
Navy's Perfect Storm: Has a Military Chaplaincy Forfeited Its ConstitutionalLegitimacy by Establishing DenominationalPreferences?, 31 W. ST. U. L. REV. 185 (2004); William A. Wildhack
III, Navy Chaplains at the Crossroads:Navigating the Intersectionof Free Speech, Free Exercise,
Establishment, and Equal Protection, 51 NAVAL L. REV. 217 (2005); Emilie Kraft Bindon, Commentary, Entangled Choices: Selecting Chaplainsfor the United States Armed Forces, 56 ALA. L.

REv. 247 (2004).
5
Larsen, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 11; Chaplaincyof Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 290; Wilkins v. United States, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41268 (S.D. Cal., June 29, 2005), aff'd, 2007 U.S.
App. LEXIS 12060 (9th Cir. 2007).
6
Klingenschmitt v. Winter, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2339 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Ken Walker,
USMC Chaplain Who Took a Stand Says Navy Is Retaliating, BAPTIST PRESS, Jan. 16, 2007,
available at http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?ID=24777.
7
William T. Cavanaugh, Jr., Note, The United States Military Chaplaincy Program:Another
Seam in the Fabric of our Society?, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 181 (1993); Christopher Hitchens,
GI Jesus: The Real Problem with Military Chaplains, SLATE, Oct. 2, 2006, available at
http://www.slate.com/id/2150801.
8
The armed services have adopted the inclusive phrase, "religious ministry professionals," to
characterize chaplains, but we will use the more familiar "clergy." See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF
DEFENSE, DIR. 1304.19, APPOINTMENT OF CHAPLAINS FOR THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS para. 4 (11

Jun. 2004) [hereinafter DOD DIR. 1304.19].
9
DOD DIR. 1304.19, supra note 8; U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, INSTR. 1304.28, GUIDANCE FOR
THE APPOINTMENT OF CHAPLAINS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS (11 Jun. 2004) [hereinafter
DOD INSTR. 1304.28].
10 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 165-1, RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES: CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES ARMY,

CHAPTER 4,

ROLES AND FUNCTIONS

OF CHAPLAINS AND CHAPLAIN

ASSISTANTS (25 Mar. 2004) [hereinafter AR 165-1]; U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, POLICY DIR. 52-1,
CHAPLAIN SERVICE (2 Oct. 2006) [hereinafter AF POLICY DiR. 52-1]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY,
OPNAV INSTR. 1730.1 D, RELIGIOUS MINISTRY IN THE NAVY (6 May 2003) [hereinafter OPNAV

INSTR. 1730.1D].
II

See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAM.

165-18, RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES: CHAPLAINCY

RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (21 Jan. 2000) [hereinafter DA PAM 165-18] (describing "how re-

sources such as funds, facilities, manpower, and property are managed, safeguarded, and accounted for").
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of religion." How, then, is the chaplaincy consistent with the Establishment
Clause of the Constitution's First Amendment?
To answer that question, courts and commentators generally turn to one
or more of the following paradigms:
* Establishment Clause history-resting on the Supreme
Court's decision in Marsh v. Chambers,'2 which upheld the
constitutionality of the Nebraska state legislature's chaplaincy,
this paradigm focuses on the long history of the armed services'
3
chaplaincy as the foundation for its current legitimacy.
e Public funding of religion-drawing from the Court's decisions from Everson v. Board of Education14 through Lemon v.
Kurtzman1 5 to Agostini v. Felton'6 on government aid for religious enterprises, this paradigm examines the various tests used
by the Court to determine when government support for religious entities
crosses a line into impermissible promotion of re17
ligion.

* Governmental display of religious messages-looking to the
Court's decisions on government presentation of religious symbols, most prominently Lynch v. Donnelly,'" this paradigm asks
whether government-sponsored religious messages reflect unconstitutional "endorsement," or permitted "acknowledgment,"
of religion.19

Although the historical approach to appraising the chaplaincy is useful
and relevant, it is not fully sufficient to answer the questions raised by today's
institution of the chaplaincy.
The paradigms of no-funding and noendorsement-to the extent that they still shape the law-arise from circumstances wholly apart from those which give rise to the chaplaincy and to constitutional questions about its scope and operation. An adequate approach for Establishment Clause analysis of the military chaplaincy requires a different
framework-one appropriate to those circumstances.

12

463 U.S. 783 (1983).

13

Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 232-33 (2d Cir. 1985).
330 U.S. 1 (1947).

14
15
16
17

18
19

403 U.S. 602 (1971).
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 232-33.
465 U.S. 668 (1984).
Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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Part II of this essay describes and analyzes Katcoff v. Marsh,2 ° the most
important decision on the constitutionality of the military chaplaincy. Part II of
the essay then turns to our contention that constitutional inquiry into the military
chaplaincy should begin from the basic insight, occasionally recognized by
courts, 2 1 that the military chaplaincy exists for the primary purpose of accom-

modating the religious needs of military personnel. As such, the chaplaincy
bears a family resemblance to other types of religious accommodations,
such as
23
22
exemptions for religious entities from regulation of employment or land use;
protections for religious exercises of prisoners 24 or employees;2 5 and arrangements for the religious instruction of public school students. 26
In a series of decisions spanning the past six decades,2 7 the Supreme
Court has considered Establishment Clause challenges to a variety of religious
accommodations. Despite the prevailing general sense of disorder in the universe of Religion Clause jurisprudence,2 8 the Court's accommodation decisions
represent a surprisingly coherent model. These decisions, taken together, suggest that religious accommodations must satisfy four, linked constitutional
norms. First, is the accommodation a reasonable effort to relieve a governmentimposed burden on religious practice? 29 Second, do beneficiaries of the ac20

755 F.2d at 232-33.

21

Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 n.10 (1963) (discussing military chap-

laincy as justified by religious needs of military personnel). See also id. at 296-98 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (same); id. at 308-09 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (same); and Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 235-37.
22
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2006) (Religious
employer is exempt from prohibition on religion-based discrimination "with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by
such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities"). See also Corp.
of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge
to exemption for religious employer from Title VII's bar on religion-based discrimination in employment).
23
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc.
24

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1.

25

Title VII, § 7010) (definition of religion includes obligation to make reasonable accommodations for employees' religious exercise). See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63 (1977) (upholding a requirement of reasonable accommodations, but construing the obligation narrowly). But see Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (holding unconstitutional, on Establishment Clause grounds, a Connecticut statute that required employers to accommodate employees' need for religious Sabbath observance).
26
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding "released time" program in which public school students are excused from school to attend religious instruction).
27
Id.; Caldor, 472 U.S. at 703; Corp. of PresidingBishop, 483 U.S. at 327; Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512
U.S. 687 (1994); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
28
See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses, 8
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725 (2006); Steven G. Gey, Life After the Establishment Clause, 110 W. VA.
L. REV. 1 (2007).
29
See infra notes 201-08 and accompanying text.
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commodation participate voluntarily? 30 Third, is the accommodation available
on a denominationally-neutral basis? 3' Fourth,
32 does the accommodation impose
significant material burdens on third parties?
In Parts IV and V, we apply those criteria to constitutional challenges
affecting the military chaplaincy. Part IV deals with the constitutional assertion
that the chaplaincy as a whole offends the Establishment Clause. We suggest
that the institution of the chaplaincy itself should survive challenge, although
specific practices of the institution have less certain constitutional footings. We
turn to such particular challenges in Part V. There, we consider the services'
policies for hiring (accession), promotion and retention of chaplains. We also
examine the services' regulation of particular aspects of chaplains' ministry,
including the conduct of worship, prayer at official functions and pastoral care.
Through our examination of each of these facets of the military chaplaincy, we
attempt to show how the Establishment Clause standards for religious accommodations should guide the relevant inquiry and judgments. We believe that
consistent application of these standards will intelligently clarify and wisely
resolve the current and heated controversies surrounding the military chaplaincy.
II. KATCoFF V. MARSH: CHALLENGING THE CHAPLAINCY

A.

The Opinion in Katcoff

In 1985, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the
first-and to this date, the only-direct constitutional challenge to the military
chaplaincy. The lawsuit, Katcoff v. Marsh,3 3 alleged that the military chaplaincy
violated the Establishment Clause because a uniformed, government-financed34
chaplaincy was not necessary to meet the religious needs of service members.
The district court dismissed the complaint, and the appellate court partly affirmed and partly reversed. 35 After a thorough review of the history and current
operation of the military chaplaincy, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that
a privately funded civilian chaplaincy could fulfill the military's requirements
for religious services.36 The court, thus, affirmed the lower court's decision that
the chaplaincy, considered in its entirety, does not violate the Constitution.37
30
31

32

See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.

755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985). See generally ISRAEL DRAZIN & CECIL B. CURREY, FOR GOD
THE HISTORY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE ARMY CHAPLAINCY
(1995); Rosen, supra note 4.
34
755 F.2d at 229-30.
35
Id. at 237-38.
36
Id. at 236-37.
33

AND COUNTRY:

37

Id. at 237.
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The court remanded the case to the lower court, however, because it concluded
that the plaintiffs might be able to show that particular practices of the chaplaincy, such as provision of religious services at domestic installations that
could readily be served by civilian chaplains, might violate the Establishment
Clause.38
Although the outcome in Katcoff seems correct, the appellate court's
searching examination of the details of the military chaplaincy came up short
when the court turned to application of the governing law. The court began its
analysis by citing the Supreme Court's decision in Marsh v. Chambers,39 which
upheld the practice of legislative prayer because of its "unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years."
Judge Mansfield's opinion for the
Second Circuit panel claimed that the military chaplaincy shared a comparable
history.4 1 The court was not entirely persuaded by the historical justification for
the chaplaincy because it then turned to the Su reme Court's three-part Establishment Clause test from Lemon v. Kurtzman. Under Lemon, a statute must
have a secular purpose, must have a primary effect that does not advance or
inhibit religion and must not excessively entangle government and religion. The
court determined that the military chaplaincy would "fail to meet the Lemon v.
Kurtzman conditions, ' ' 43 but the court did not treat thisn failure as dispositive of
the chaplaincy's fate under the Establishment Clause."
Instead, the Court said that the Establishment Clause concerns reflected
in the Lemon test must be balanced against interests arising from both the War
Power Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.4 5 The court found in the War
Power Clause a requirement of significant judicial deference to Congress in
military affairs:
[W]hen a matter provided for by Congress in the exercise of its
war power and implemented by the Army appears reasonably
relevant and necessary to furtherance of our national defense it
should be treated as presumptively valid and any doubt as to its
constitutionality should be resolved as a matter of judicial com38

Id. at 237-38. Before any further hearing on the remand, the plaintiffs abandoned the case.

See DRAZIN & CURREY, supra note 33, at 203-04; RICHARD G. HUTCHESON, JR., THE CHURCHES

16 (rev. ed., U.S. Government Printing Office 1998).
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 232 (discussing and quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792).

AND THE CHAPLAINCY

39
40
41
42

Id.
Id. (discussing and quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).

43

Id.

In this regard, Katcoff was following the Supreme Court's lead in the then-recent opinion in
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), which had similarly declared that the Lemon standards
were guideposts, but were not always controlling. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
45
Katcoff, 755 F.2d. at 233 (discussing the War Powers Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Free
Exercise Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. I).
44
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ity in favor of deference to the military's exercise of discre46
tion.
Moreover, the court found the chaplaincy to be a necessary means of
avoiding violation of service members' rights under the Free Exercise Clause.47
By removing soldiers from their religious communities, the court reasoned, the
military has interfered with their opportunity to engage in religious activity, and,
thus, might be deemed to have infringed the service members' right to free exercise. 48 The chaplaincy provides the means through which Congress has insu49
lated the military from liability for such infringements of religious liberty.
Taken together, the court concluded, the concerns reflected in the War Power
and Free Exercise Clauses override more traditional principles of nonestablishment. 50 Thus, the military chaplaincy is justified as a necessary response in
"circumstances where the practice of religion would otherwise be denied as a
'51
practical matter to all or a substantial number.
B.

Post-Katcoff Cases and Commentary-The Failureof Conventional
Paradigms

Subsequent constitutional challenges to the military chaplaincy have focused primarily on personnel issues and, in particular, the preferences allegedly
given to chaplains of certain faith groups over others for purposes of recruitment, promotion and retention. In deciding these cases, courts have continued
with the struggle evident in Katcoff to find a coherent methodology for resolving Establishment Clause challenges to the military chaplaincy. For example, a
ruling of the D.C. Circuit in Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England
adopts the concept of governmental "endorsement" of religion as its preferred
standard for Establishment Clause scrutiny of the chaplaincy.53 In a recent and
promising judicial development, 54 the U.S. District Court for the District of Co46

Id. at 234.

47

Id. at 234-35.

48

Id.

49
50

Id.
Id. at 235.

51

Id. at 237.

52
Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v,
England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In re England, 375 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Larsen v.
U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2007); Adair v. England, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2006).
53 454 F.3d 290, 302 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
54
Larsen, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 11. Judge Urbina published his opinion in Larsen within a few
weeks after we delivered this paper at the Symposium. We discuss Larsen further in Part IV.A.,
infra.
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lumbia relied on a model of accommodation, akin to what we propose, when it
ruled that the U.S. Navy did not have to accept chaplain candidates in precise
proportion to the Navy's faith demographics.5 5
Legal commentators have generally taken the same route as pre-Larsen
courts in constitutional assessments of the military chaplaincy. These commentators typically invoke some mix of the three major strands of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence-the historical approach in Marsh, the three-part Lemon
test, and the "endorsement" standard from the public display decisions, supplemented by the war powers and free exercise concerns reflected in Katcoff.5 6 The
resulting analysis tends to reveal the underlying uncertainty with respect to applicable legal standards. Nearly all commentators accept the judgment in Katcoff, that the institution survives facial challenge under the Establishment
Clause, but their explanation of that judgment and their examination of specific
practices of the chaplaincy are deeply unpersuasive because of the difficulty of
explaining why any particular standard should be applied in a given context.
This struggle of courts and commentators is understandable. The field
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence is littered with tests, 57 and the military
chaplaincy seems to possess elements drawn from the full range of problems
that implicate disestablishment principles. What other arm of government finances religious instruction, erects religious displays, and engages in officially
sponsored prayer and worship? Unfortunately, the tests appropriate to such
contexts, which are most often invoked by courts and commentators in assessments of the military chaplaincy, are ill-suited to this task.
The argument from history, found in Marsh v. Chambers,58 has been
applied by the Supreme Court only to legislative chaplaincies, 59 and seems to
rest on the specific characteristics of religious activity in such chaplaincies.
Specifically, the Supreme Court noted that the challenged invocations were brief
at 31-33.

55

Id.

56

See Michael J. Benjamin, Justice, Justice Shall You Pursue: Legal Analysis of Religion

Issues in the Army, 1998-NOV Army Law 1, 2-8; Aden, supra note 4, at 188-98; Bindon, supra
note 4, at 273-83; Cavanaugh, supra note 7 at 199-218; Cook, supra note 4, at 19-25; Wildhack,
supra note 4, at 225-29.
57
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971) (three-part test for determining impermissible governmental involvement with religion); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790-792
(1983) (historically accepted practices withstand Establishment Clause challenges); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-694 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Establishment Clause protects against governmental endorsement of religion); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 655-679 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part) (Establishment Clause protects against government-coerced religious exercises); Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 230 (1997) (revision of Lemon test).
58
463 U.S. at 790-792.
59
There has been a recent flurry of lower court decisions about prayer in state and local legislative bodies. See, e.g., Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006); Simpson v. Chesterfield
County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005); Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, S.C.,
376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004); Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999);
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998).
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and non-sectarian, and were conducted in a setting in which listeners were free
to come and go as they pleased.60 In the absence of such characteristics, the
Court indicated, the historical foundation of the legislative chaplaincy would be
insufficient to withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny. 61 The military chaplaincy, however, involves much more extensive religious activity than the ceremonial practice contemplated in Marsh. As we discuss later, military chaplains
may be called upon to perform ceremonial functions, in some ways akin to legislative prayer.62 Such functions, however, do not comprise the core of the
chaplains' obligations, which involve the provision of specifically religious services.
Nor is the three-part test from Lemon 63 _or its more recent revision in
Agostini v. Felton64-a particularly useful standard for assessing the military
chaplaincy. The questions asked in Lemon and Agostini focus on the government's involvement in religious activity undertaken with the government's financial assistance. 65 At first glance, the chaplaincy would seem to fall within
this ambit because the government does spend money on the chaplaincy. But
the analytic focus of Lemon and Agostini is quite different. Through the purpose and effect prongs of the standards derived from those decisions, courts
determine whether the government bears responsibility for the religious activity
of government-supported, private religious organizations. 66 Ordinarily, government support does not convert the conduct of a private entity into "state action" for constitutional purposes.6 7 Under the Establishment Clause, however,
the government may be held responsible for the religious activities of statefunded private entities, and the Lemon and Agostini standards are intended to
determine when such responsibility is fairly assigned to the government. The
Lemon and Agostini tests, thus, focus on factors peculiarly suited to the relationship between government and private religious institutions, such as the extent of
government-imposed safeguards on religious use of funds, the monitoring of
compliance with those safeguards and the risks of entanglement between government and religion. 68 In contrast, the government funds the military chap60
61

Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793-94.
Id. at 790 ("Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of

constitutional guarantees, but there is far more here than simply historical patterns.").
62
See infra notes 431-34 and accompanying text.
63
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
64
521 U.S. 203, 230 (1997).
65
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222-30.
66
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230 (An Establishment Clause analysis of government aid to religion
is undertaken in order to determine "whether any use of that aid to indoctrinate religion could be
attributed to the State.").
67 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
68
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 844-845, 857-863 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (restating Lemon-Agostini test in context of aid to religious schools).
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laincy for the specific purpose of delivering religious services, so application of
the Lemon-Agostini tests seems conceptually misplaced.
The Establishment Clause tests applied in challenges to public displays
of religion are equally ill-suited to scrutiny of the military chaplaincy. From
Lynch 69 through the Court's most recent decisions in this context, McCreary
County 70 and Van Orden,71 the disputes have centered on the question of
whether the display reflects a message of government promotion ("endorsement") of religion or mere "acknowledgment" of the historical-i.e., arguably
non-religious-significance of the religious display.7 2 The religious content of
the military chaplaincy, however, can hardly be deemed a matter of reasonable
doubt. The government erects chapels and pays the salaries of chaplains precisely because of the religious significance of such places and people. Attempts
by courts and commentators to determine whether practices or policies of the
chaplaincy reflect constitutionally impermissible endorsement of religion are
thus doomed to failure.7 3
Perhaps sensing the conceptual inadequacy of these traditional paradigms, the appellate court in Katcoff ultimately appealed to two additional constitutional provisions-the grant of War Powers and the Free Exercise Clausein finding that the military chaplaincy withstood Establishment Clause challenge.74 Although reliance on these clauses is understandable, neither supports a
credible theory of how and why Establishment Clause interests must give way.75
The argument based on the grant of War Powers fails to recognize an essential
characteristic of the Establishment Clause. Unlike other provisions of the bill of
rights, such as the protections for speech or religious exercise, the Establishment
Clause has not traditionally been treated as subject to a "public necessity" limitation. 76 In other words, the state may not successfully respond to an Establish-

69

465 U.S. 668 (1984).

70

McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).

71

Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677 (citing a long list of "illustrations of the Government's

72

acknowledgment of our religious heritage and governmental sponsorship of graphic manifestations of that heritage"); cf id. at 697 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (nativity scene represents official
endorsement rather than acknowledgment of Christianity).
73
As Alexander Bickel wrote years ago in a different context, "No answer is what the wrong
question begets .... " ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 103 (Bobbs-Merrill
1962).
74
Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 223 (2d Cir. 1985).
75
This failure of explanation is highlighted in a panel member's partial dissent, objecting to
the remand for evaluation of specific practices of the chaplaincy). Id. at 238 (Meskill, J., concurring and dissenting).
76
Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221-29 (1972) (deciding that a state's interest
in compulsory school attendance did not outweigh religious liberty interest of Old Order Amish
community in withholding children from school after eighth grade), with Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas
Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704-06 (1994) (after finding that creation of special school district
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ment Clause claim by an77 appeal to the public benefits generated by the challenged religious activity.
With respect to the argument based on the Free Exercise Clause, the
court in Katcoff significantly overestimated the strength of service members'
free exercise rights. The court suggested that the military would be constitutionally required to provide some form of chaplaincy in order to avoid infringing the free exercise rights of soldiers who would be separated from their places
and communities of religious worship. 78 Such an overestimate was understandable in 1985, but not today. In the intervening twenty years, the Court has dramatically restricted the scope of the constitutional protection for Free Exercise
Clause. The Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith79 refused to extend strict judicial scrutiny to "general rules of neutral applicability" that happen to burden religious exercise.8 °
Virtually all military regulations that hinder service members' religious exercise
represent such "general rules," including deployment orders, restrictions on offbase travel and duty schedules. None of these types of regulations specifically
target religious practices for disfavor, but all are capable of imposing serious
obstacles to religious exercise.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 81 may provide service members
with some degree of protection for religious practices. The scope of that protection, however, would likely be limited by the Court's strong deference to
military authorities, reflected in Goldman v. Weinberger.83 RFRA purports to
restore the pre-Smith law, of which Goldman remains a part, so there is no reafor Orthodox Jewish community violates the Establishment Clause, Court does not balance that
judgment against state interest in having such a school district).
77
See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 301-04 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(Establishment Clause not subject to same balancing tests as other First Amendment rights, and,
thus, violation is by definition an irreparable injury for purposes of preliminary injunctive relief).
78
In Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 234, the court wrote: "Unless the Army provided a chaplaincy it
would deprive the soldier of his right ... under the Free Exercise Clause to practice his freely
chosen religion." The court appears to link this obligation with "compulsory" military service, but
the draft ended a decade before Katcoff was decided, and elsewhere, the court treats the obligation
as one owed to all service members, whether volunteers or draftees. But see Larsen v. United
States Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11, 31-33 (D.D.C. 2007) (ruling that military chaplaincy program is
not a mandatory accommodation of service members' free exercise rights, but a permissive accommodation of service members' free exercise interests).
79
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
80
Id. at 878-82.
81
42 U.S.C § 2000bb. RFRA still applies in full force to the federal government. The Court's
decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), held RFRA unconstitutional as applied
to the states because the Act exceeded the powers of Congress under the 14th Amendment.
82
Gonzalez v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (applying RFRA to the federal government).
83
475 U.S. 503 (1986). In Goldman, the Court refused to require the military to accommodate
an officer's religious interest in wearing a yarmulke.
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son to believe that RFRA protects free exercise rights in the military any more
than the First Amendment does.84
The reliance in Katcoff on free exercise interests places the constitutional analysis in the appropriate framework, as does the court's decision to remand the case for determination of the practices "reasonably necessary" to meet
service members' religious needs. 85 What the court lacked, however, was a
model of Establishment Clause review that more directly addressed the issues
raised by a government program that purports to address specific religious
needs. Such a model does exist, although in 1985 it was far less developed in
86
the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence than it is today.
Over the past six decades, the Supreme Court has decided a significant number
of cases involving Establishment Clause challenges to governmental "accommodations" of religious practices otherwise burdened by the government. After
a brief survey of these decisions,87 we sketch out the model of Establishment
Clause analysis that they embody.
HI.
A.

THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION

The Leading Decisions on Accommodation of Religion

The concept of accommodation first appears in the Court's 1952 decision, Zorach v. Clauson8 8 which upheld a program of "released time" religious
84

Moreover, the court in Katcoff suggested that service members' free exercise rights might

offset possible Establishment Clause violations. Even if that were so, which we doubt, statutory
rights under RFRA are not constitutionally based, and would not therefore have the same offsetting force. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 508-09 (RFRA exceeds scope of protection accorded by the
Free Exercise Clause).
85
Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 237-38 (2d. Cir. 1985).
86

Indeed, the three leading Supreme Court decisions on religious accommodations appeared

in the four years immediately following the appellate court decision in Katcoff. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987);
Tex. Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
87
The leading secondary commentary on accommodations includes Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original Understanding of the Establishment
Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793 (2006); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Accommodation and Equal
Liberty, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1007 (2001); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992); Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. I. One of the co-authors of this
article has taken a generally negative view of religion-specific accommodations. See Ira C. Lupu,
The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743 (1992); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against DiscretionaryAccommodation of Religion, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991). Both of Professor Lupu's anti-accommodation articles, however, are
like Professor Bressman's article in that they have criticized those accommodations that single out
religion for favored treatment. The military chaplaincy does not fit that description because the
military similarly responds to the needs of service members for many other kinds of social experiences, including athletics and secular cultural experience.
88
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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instruction that was operated by the New York public schools. 89 On approval
from their parents, schoolchildren were released from public schools in order to
receive religious instruction.9" The instruction was conducted and funded by a
variety of religious institutions and offered outside of the schools. 91 During the
period for religious instruction, those students whose parents did not consent to
religious instruction remained in school.9 2 Providers of religious instruction
informed the school of any student who had been released into this program, but
had failed to report for religious instruction.93
Plaintiffs brought an Establishment Clause challenge to the program,
arguing that it effectively made the public schools full partners in the enterprise
of religious instruction.94 The plaintiffs had reason to be optimistic about their
claim because four years earlier, the Supreme Court had held unconstitutional a
similar program in McCollum v. Board of Education.95

There, the Supreme

Court enjoined a program under which teachers of religion, representing a variety of faiths, came to the public schools for one period each week. 96 Parents
could elect for their children to receive instruction from a specific teacher; those
students who were not enrolled in religious instruction remained at school (but
typically were not given alternative instruction during the period).9 7 By a vote
of 8-1, the Court ruled that the program violated the Establishment Clause
through its conferral of support, both material and otherwise, on religious education. 98
In Zorach, however, a 6-3 majority rejected the Establishment Clause
challenge, and upheld the New York released time program.99 The two programs are, however, distinguishable: in the Illinois scheme, the teachers of religion used public school classrooms and were screened by school personnel,
while the New York religion classes took place outside the schools and generally involved less school supervision.' °° The major conceptual difference between the cases is Justice Douglas's introduction of the idea of accommodation.
Although the Court's opinion is best known for Douglas's comment, "We are a
89

Id. at 312-14.

90

Id. at 308. The procedures and forms for parental approval are detailed in the lower court

opinion in the case Zorach v. Clauson, 99 N.Y.S.2d 339, 340-43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950).
91 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308 n.1.
92
Id. at 321 (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting) (discussing requirement that non-participating students remain in school during released time religious instruction).
93
Id. at 308.
94
Id. at 309-10.
95 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
96

97
98

99

Id. at 207-12.
Id. at 207-09, 207 n.2.
Id. at 210-12.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 306 (1952).

100 Id. at 311-12, 315.
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religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,"' 10 the rest of
that paragraph holds a more enduring legacy of the decision. We quote at length
from the relevant portion of Douglas's majority opinion:
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates
with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.
For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold
that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups ....

.. . In the McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious instruction and the force of the public school was used to
promote that instruction. Here, as we have said, the public
schools do no more than accommodate their schedules to a program of outside religious instruction. We follow the McCollum
case. But we cannot expand it to cover the present released
time program unless separation of Church and State means that
public institutions can make no adjustments of their schedules
to accommodate the religious needs of the people. 10 2
The concept of accommodation, thus, grows from a fairly common meaning of
the term-to make room for something within a schedule. The schedule, of
course, was the public school day, and the Court's reasoning started with the
basic assertion that schools regularly release individual students for religious
observances as requested by their parents. 0 3 The schools should be free to do
the same on a larger scale, releasing not just isolated students but any whose
parents wished their children to receive such instruction. By making room in
the schedule, the government opened an opportunity for individuals to choose to
engage in religious activity.1 4 Thus, the government's role was responsive to
parental need, rather than motivated by the state's own agenda in support of
religious instruction. 0 5 The state acted to facilitate private religiosity, rather
101 Id. at 313. At the time, Justice Douglas was considering-not for the first time-a run for
the presidency. See

BRUCE ALAN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM

0.

DOUGLAS 212-32 (2003).

104

Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-15.
Id. at 313.
Id.at 311.

lOs

Id. at 313.

102
103
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than to offer religious content of the state's own devising.'0 6 Moreover, the program was formally open to all faiths. 1
The Court's opinion leaves much to be desired. Not once did the Court
address the question of why parents need this particular accommodation to provide their children with religious instruction. Presumably, the length of the
school day did not preclude religious instruction before or after regular classroom hours. Perhaps parents and children were not as likely to make use of
their non-school time for religious education.'0 8 In dissent, Justice Jackson
asked why the school day could not simply be shortened, and such children as
were willing could attend religious instruction. °9 He then provided the answer:
"But that suggestion is rejected upon the ground that if they are made free many
students will not go to the Church."" 0 Seen from that perspective, the released
time program functions more as a public stimulus and enforcement mechanism
for religious education. 1
The Court's opinion also demonstrated a complete lack of interest in the
experience of students who do not attend religious instruction during the designated period. It noted only that students were not "forced" to participate in religious instruction." 2 As Frankfurter argued in dissent, the school may indeed
close its doors during the period of religious instruction, but "they are closed
upon those students who do not attend the religious instruction, in order to keep
them within the school." ' 1 3 The obligation to remain in school, Frankfurter asserted, imposed a burden on non-participating schoolchildren.' 14 The children
faced a choice-they could remain in school for extra work, or at least extra
115
time in "captivity," or they could agree to participate in religious instruction.
This choice, Justice Frankfurter suggested, raised the significant possibility that
the state had established religion through its released time program." 6

108

Id. at 314.
Id. at 309 n. 1.
Id. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

109

Id. at 324 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

106
107

11o Id.

Id. at 318 (Black, J., dissenting). A student enrolled in religious instruction who failed to
appear without excuse would be truant, and would be in violation of the state's compulsory attendance law. Id. at 308, 309 n.1.
112
Id. at 311-12 (majority opinion).
"'

114

Id. at 321 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id.

115

Id.

116

Id. (arguing that the Court failed to consider possible coercion of students). In his dissent,

113

Justice Jackson made essentially the same argument against the released time plan as Justice
Frankfurter. Because the state releases from "captivity" only those students who are willing to
receive religious instruction, and consequently "imprisons" those who are unwilling to receive
religious instruction, the state has unconstitutionally exercised its coercive powers in support of
religion. Id. at 323-25 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Professor Lupu's experience with the program as
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Whether or not the Court correctly decided Zorach, the decision created
the seed of the accommodation concept. Zorach contains within it both the concept's justification' 17 and, as explicated in the dissenting opinions, the limitations later to be imposed on it. 11 Pushing back against the Everson decision's9
embrace of a strongly separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause,"
Zorach advanced an alternative history of the Clause that had first been articulated in Justice Reed's McCollum dissent. 20 Under this history, the founders'
decision not to establish a national church went hand-in-hand with a general
agreement that religion deserves great respect in the polity.' 21 Such respect includes official recognition of the importance of religion to the citizenry, made
concrete in Thanksgiving proclamations, legislative prayers and other public
ceremonies that include mention of the divine. 122 Accommodation of religion
played, and continues to play, a central role in this alternative to strict separationism. Through accommodation of religion, the government demonstrates
respect for the religious lives of its people.
In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,

23

the Court held

unconstitutional the practice of prayer and devotional Bible reading in public
schools. For our purposes, the case is important because Justice Brennan's concurring opinion offers the first sustained exploration of the concept of accommodation.' 24 Those who defended the practice of prayer and Bible reading had
argued that the practice should be upheld under Zorach as a permissible ac-

a child in upstate New York confirms this experience of "imprisonment." Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 743, 743-44 n.4 (1992).
117 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 311-15.
118 Id. at 315-25 (dissenting opinions).
119 See generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1947) (reviewing the history of
disestablishment in colonial era and early republic). See also id. at 33-42 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (focusing on debates in Virginia over disestablishment).
120 Zorach, 343 U.S. 306, 312-14. See also McCoilum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 244-48
(1948) (Reed, J., dissenting).
121
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-14.
122 Id. at 312-13. The paradigmatic statement of this "alternative" Establishment Clause history
can be found in the dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (Lambeth Press 1982) (challenging separa-

tionist interpretation of constitutional history).
123
374 U.S. 203 (1963). We omit discussion here of McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961), in which the Supreme Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the Maryland
Sunday closing laws. The Court's decision in McGowan touched on the idea of accommodation,
but the opinion depended almost entirely on the judgment that the originally religious purposes of
Sunday closing laws had been transformed into secular grounds for a uniform day of rest. Id. at
446-52. The Court reasoned that the choice of Sunday as the day of rest merely recognizes and
coordinates the habits of the vast majority of people. Id. at 451-52.
124
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 294-305 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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commodation of the religious needs of students enrolled in public schools.' 25 In
the majority opinion, written by Justice Clark, the Court focused on the government's obligation of religious neutrality, which the Court deemed to have
been violated by the Bible reading and prayer.' 26 Through the schools' use of
the Lord's Prayer and King James Version of the Bible, the Court held that the
government was intentionally advancing 127
one set of religions over others, and
also advancing religion over non-religion.
In his concurring opinion, which was quoted at length in Katcoff, 128
Justice Brennan directly confronted the school officials' defense of the challenged practice as an accommodation of religion. 129 Brennan used the military
chaplaincy as the paradigmatic form of a permissible accommodation, and
against that form he contrasted prayer and Bible reading in schools.' 30 His concurrence noted several features of the military chaplaincy that save it from unconstitutionality. First, the chaplaincy responds to a significant burden on service members' free exercise of religion; the source of this burden is their isolation from ordinary opportunities for civilian worship.'3 1 Second, the chaplain's
religious services are provided only to those who ask to receive them, and those
who do not seek religious services suffer no penalty for that decision. 32 Brennan reasoned that the schools' practice of prayer and Bible reading lacked either
of those characteristics. 33 Students attending public schools suffer no material
isolation from ordinary opportunities for worship or religious instruction so the
government cannot plausibly claim that its religious exercises are designed to
alleviate a government-imposed burden.' 34 Moreover, the religious experience
is provided to all students, not just to those who choose to receive it. 135 Taken
together, these features of the challenged religious exercises suggest that they
125

Justice Stewart's dissent develops this argument at some length; he contends that the prac-

tice should be upheld because it permissibly advances the free exercise interest of parents "who
affirmatively desire to have their children's school day open with the reading of passages from the
Bible." kL at 312-13 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
126
Id. at 223-25 (majority opinion).
127
Id. at 224 (noting that the permission to use the "Catholic Douay version" for readings did
not save the practice from unconstitutionality because the practice inevitably places the power of
the state behind a particular understanding of religion).
128
Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 234-35 n.4 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at
296-98 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
129
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 294-304 (Brennan, J., concurring).
130
Id. at 298-99.
131
Id. at 297-98.
132
Id. at 298.
133

Id. at 298-99.
Id. at 299.
135 Id. at 299-300 (comparing school students to legislators, who are free to absent themselves
from legislative prayer if they so choose, whereas schoolchildren do not enjoy that same freedom
to leave without penalty, "direct or indirect").
134
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were intended to further religious purposes of the 36government rather than to
accommodate the religious needs of schoolchildren. 1
Although Zorach and Schempp predate Katcoff, the Supreme Court's
most significant decisions involving religious accommodation did not appear
until the two years immediately following the Katcoff decision. 137 From 1985 to
1987, the Court considered the scope of government accommodation of religion
in four cases: Wallace v. Jaffree, 38 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,13 9 Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 140 and Texas Monthly v. Bullock. 141 Although the
four cases involve quite disparate legal contexts-from school prayer to employment to taxation-each represents an Establishment Clause challenge to a
government program that purported to relieve a burden imposed on religious
activity.
In three of the decisions, Wallace, Estate of Thornton, and Texas
Monthly, the Court rejected the government's claim that the challenged program
was a constitutionally permissible accommodation of religion.
Wallace involved Alabama's moment of silence provisions, which permitted public school
teachers to "announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such
period no other activities shall be engaged in."' 14 3 A previously enacted Alabama statute also contained a moment of silence provision, which used essentially the same language except that it omitted the reference to voluntary
prayer. 44 The Court held that the newly enacted provision was unconstitutional
because it lacked a plausible secular purpose. 45 The prior moment of silence
provision fully achieved the state's expressed purpose of accommodating students' private, voluntary religious exercise.1 46 Such accommodations, the
Court's opinion implied, must be directed toward, and limited to, the facilitation

136

Id. at 299.

137 Between Schemmp and Katcoff, the Court decided Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970). Walz upheld New York State's tax exemption for real estate owned and used for religious
purposes by religious organizations. Although the opinion uses the language of accommodation,
see 397 U.S. at 673, the exemption applied equally to secular non-profit organizations, and was
not designed to relieve a distinctive burden on religious entities. The Walz decision, thus, plays a
relatively insignificant part in the law of permissive accommodation because the exemption it
upheld is neither religion-favoring nor an affirmative provision of resources to religious entities.
138 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
139 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
140
483 U.S. 327 (1987).
141 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
142
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38; Estate of Thorton, 472 U.S. at 703; Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 1.
143

Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40 n.1 (citing ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984)).
144 Id. at 58-59.
145

Id. at 59-60.

146 Id. at 59.
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of voluntary private religious activity. 147 Seen in that light, the subsequent ento promote prayer as the
actment was superfluous, and was properly understood
148
silence.
of
moment
the
use
to
way
state-preferred
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor further elaborated on the
difference between a permissible accommodation and the Alabama statute
struck down by the decision. 149 A moment of silence provision, O'Connor said,
may withstand constitutional scrutiny because the religious substance-if
any-of the student's meditation is supplied entirely by the student.150 The government may not specify any particular content of the meditation, or even that
the state prefers the students to use the time for religious meditation.' 51 The
shift from facilitation to promotion of religious exercise is determinative. So
long as the state allows the student to choose whether the moment will be used
for religious exercise and does not steer the student toward such exercise, the
accommodation satisfies the Establishment Clause. 152 O'Connor concluded that
Alabama's subsequent enactment of the statute that authorized "voluntary
153
prayer" moved the state from accommodation to promotion of religion.
In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,154 the Supreme Court considered an Establishment Clause challenge to a Connecticut statute that required employers to
accommodate their employees' religious desire to observe a Sabbath. 155 The
statute provided that, "No person who states that a particular day of the week is
observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day.
An employee's refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for
his dismissal.' 5 6 When Thornton, an employee, refused to work on his Sabbath, he was demoted to a lower position and he then resigned. 57 Invoking the
Connecticut Sabbath accommodation statute, Thornton filed a grievance against
Caldor, his employer. 58 Caldor defended by challenging the constitutionality of
147

Id.

148

Id. (citation omitted):

Appellants have not identified any secular purpose that was not fully served
by § 16-1-20 before the enactment of § 16-1-20.1. Thus, only two conclusions
are consistent with the text of § 16-1-20.1: (1) the statute was enacted to convey a message of state endorsement and promotion of prayer; or (2) the statute
was enacted for no purpose. No one suggests that the statute was nothing but
a meaningless or irrational act.
149 Id. at 67-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150

Id. at 72.

151

Id. at 73.
Id. at 73, 75-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 76-79.
472 U.S. 703 (1985).
Id. at 707-08.

152

153
154
155

Id. at 706 (quoting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b) (1985) (footnote omitted).
157 Id. at 706-07.
156

158

Id.
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the statute, arguing that the statute had the primary
effect of advancing religion,
59
Clause.1
Establishment
the
violated
thus,
and,
The Supreme Court agreed with the employer and held the statute unconstitutional. 60 Caldor is different from the earlier accommodation cases because the statute relieved its beneficiaries of a burden imposed by private parties
rather than by the government.' 6' In striking down the statute, the Court focused on the statute's "absolute and unqualified" grant of an accommodation to
sabbatarians. 62 The statute disregarded employers' attempts to make reasonable accommodations, the economic costs of employers' compliance, and the
burdens such accommodations might impose on fellow employees. 6 3 By categorically preferring the religious exercise of sabbatarians to the interests of employers and fellow employees, the Court said, the statute crossed the line from
permissible accommodation to impermissible government favoritism for religion.' 64 A statute that required employers to make reasonable accommodations,
such as Title VII, would not suffer from the same defect because it simply required employers to take65employees' religious needs into account alongside
other legitimate interests.
In Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 166 the Court held unconstitutional a Texas
statute under which religious publications were exempted from a sales tax that
was otherwise imposed on all publications. 167 The Court held that the exemption, limited only to religious publications, violated the Establishment Clause
because it lacked a plausible secular purpose. 168 The state claimed that the exemption was necessary to protect the free exercise interests of religious publishers, but the Court determined that the exemption failed to meet an essential requirement for a constitutionally permissible accommodation of religion: the
159

Id. at 707.
Id. at 708, 710-11.
161 Caldorthus resembles TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), in which the Court up160

held the constitutionality of the requirement in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act that private
employers reasonably accommodate the religious practices of employees, id. at 81-83, but construed the accommodation requirement to demand only de minimis accommodations by employers. Id. at 84-85. Anything more demanding, the Court suggested, would impose an unconstitutionally severe burden on employers to subsidize the religious experiences of their employees. Id.
162 Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709.
163

Id. at 708-10.

164

Id. at 7 10-11.

165 Id. at 711-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
166 489 U.S. 1 (1989). For a recent decision applying the principles of Texas Monthly, see
Budlong v. Graham, 488 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (Georgia's sales and use tax exemptions for Bibles and other specified religious literature violate the Free Press Clause of the First
Amendment because they single out religious literature for favored treatment.). This was the
ground for Justice White's concurring opinion in Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 25-26 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
167 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5.
168 Id. at 14-16.
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accommodation did not relieve any distinctive burden on religion. 169 The sales
tax may have added slightly to the price of the religious materials to be paid by
the consumer, and, therefore, may have reduced sales at the margin.170 But imposition of the tax did not make it especially difficult or unlawful to sell the
literature.17' Nor did payment of the tax proceeds to the state conflict with the
172
tenets of any organization or group that was engaged in such transactions.
Without such a burden of significant lost sales or conflict with religious princifor religious publications represented an
ples as its foundation, the exemption
17 3
unconstitutional benefit to religion.
In this quartet of accommodation decisions that appeared in the late
1980s, the Court upheld the challenged accommodation only once. ' 74 Corp. of
the Presiding Bishop v. Amos 175 involved a challenge to the exemption for religious employers, found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, from the prohibition
on religion-based employment discrimination. 7 6 An employee who had been
discharged from his position as building engineer of a religious facility owned
by the Mormon Church filed suit against the employer alleging religious discrimination.177 He claimed that the complete exemption of religious employers
from the ban on religious discrimination violated the Establishment Clause by
giving a special benefit to religious employers. 78 The Court rejected the challenge,9 and held that the exemption was a permissible accommodation of religion.

17

In unanimously reaching this conclusion, the Court made two findings.
First, it determined that the exemption alleviated a distinctive burden on religious employers, for whom the restriction on religion-based employment was
more likely to affect core aspects of the enterprise than such restrictions imposed on a secular employer. 180 Second, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument-formally similar to the one made in Wallace v. Jaffree-that a prior
8
'
statutory regime offered a sufficient accommodation for religious employers.'
The Court disagreed and found that Congress had made a reasonable judgment
that the prior Title VII exemption, which included only employees responsible
169

Id. at 17-19.

170

Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 18-19.

171
172
173
174

Id. at 17-18.
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).

175

Id.

176

Id. at 329 n.1 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l).

177

Id.

178

Id.

179

Id. at 336-38.

180

Id. at 338.

181

Id. at 335-36. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 489 U.S. 38, 58-60 (1985).

at 330-31.
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for the employer's religious message, was administratively and substantively
insufficient to alleviate the burden on religious employers. 182 Whether Amos is
viewed as a religion-favoring accommodation, 83 or as we prefer, an accommodation that equalizes the position of religious organizations with their secular
counterparts, 184 Amos represents a high-water mark for the law of permissive
accommodation.
Over the last twenty years, the Court has considered two additional
challenges to religious accommodations: Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v.
Grumet 85 and Cutter v. Wilkinson.' 86 In Kiryas Joel, the Court held unconstitutional a New York statute that created a special school district for a village oc187
cupied only by members of a particular religious group, the Satmar Hasidim.
The community had requested the state legislature to create such a public school
88
district, so that its disabled students could get the benefit of state assistance.
The Court determined that the statute alleviated a distinct burden on the religious practice of the community by freeing its disabled children from attending
school in a nearby town, where they experienced significant distress because of
their different dress and customs. 189 The statute, nevertheless, violated the Establishment Clause because the government failed to show that a similar accommodation would have been provided to other religious groups.190 Moreover,
the Court found the accommodation unnecessary, as secular alternatives might
have alleviated the community's burden without requiring the creation of the
special district. 191
182

Amos, 483 U.S. at 336-37.

183

See McConnell, supra note 87, at 692-93.
184
The Title VII exemption for religion-based hiring by religious organizations is an equalizer
because other cause-oriented organizations remain entirely free to discriminate in favor of those
who subscribe to their cause. For example, political parties are free to hire only those who are
politically loyal to the party, feminist organizations may insist that their employees be feminists,
and so on. Similarly, the inclusion of student religious clubs in the class of student organizations
to which public schools must give "equal access" if the schools permit noncurricular clubs represents an accommodation for religious clubs equal to that provided their secular counterparts. The
Supreme Court upheld the Equal Access Act, which codified this obligation of public schools, in
Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
185 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
186
544 U.S. 709 (2005).
187
Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 696.
188
The non-disabled students in the Village attended a private, Hasidic academy. Id. at 687.
At the time, the Court's prior ruling in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) made it unconstitutional for the state to give the private, religious academy any state aid for the education of disabled
children. The Court later overruled Aguilar in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997).
189
Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 692, 711, 724.
190 Id. at 702-07 (majority opinion).
191 Id. at 707-09. These might have included provision for special education in a neighboring
public school district, accomplished in a way that addressed the fears of the Satmar Hasidic children. See id. at 711-712 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Martha Minow, The Constitution and
the Subgroup Question, 71 IND. L.J. 1, 19-23 (1995) (discussing fears of Satmar Hasidic children).
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In its most recent foray into the area of religious accommodations, the
Court rejected a challenge to part of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). 9 2 In its relevant provision, RLUIPA protects the
religious exercise of "institutionalized persons," including prisoners, by requiring the state to afford reasonable accommodations to the sincere religious practices of such persons. 193 The State of Ohio claimed that RLUIPA violated the
Establishment Clause by requiring the state to prefer the religious interests of
inmates over secular interests of others. 194 A unanimous Court rejected the
state's claim, and found that the statute was a permissible accommodation.' 95
Citing Amos, the Court determined that the statute responded to a class of distinct burdens
on religion caused by the state's incarceration of those protected
19 6
act.
the
by
Most importantly, the Court distinguished Ohio's facial challenge to the
statute from potential as-applied challenges that might be brought in the future. 197 The Court ruled that RLUIPA is capable of being administered constitutionally, but is susceptible to as-applied challenges if specific accommodations
exceed the scope permitted under the Establishment Clause. 198 The Court said
that applications of RLUIPA might violate the Establishment Clause if such
accommodations manifested denominational favoritism or imposed significant
material burdens on third parties, whether guards or fellow inmates. 199 To ensure that accommodations do not impose such burdens, the Court instructed the
lower courts that RLUIPA should be interpreted with appropriate deference to
judgments of prison officials about the safety, security and welfare of those
within the prison environment.2 °°
B.

Drawing Principlesfrom the Court's Decisions

Although the decisions from Zorach to Cutter have arisen in a wide
range of contexts, a set of consistent themes emerges from them. As we elabo192

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713-14 (2005) (affirming constitutionality of RLUIPA's

provision concerning the religious exercise of persons confined in government institutions, 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(l)-(2)). The provision concerning religious land uses was not before the
Court.
193 42 U.S.C. § 2000-cc-l(a)(1)-(2), quoted in Cutter, 544 U.S. at 712 ("No government shall
impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution," unless the burden furthers "a compelling governmental interest," and does so by "the
least restrictive means.").
194
Id. at 712, 717-18.
195
Id. at 713-14.
196
Id. at 720-21.
197

198
199
200

Id. at 725.
Id. at 722, 725-26.
Id. at 722-23.
Id. at 725-26.
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rate below, the Court has relied on four criteria to distinguish permissible from
impermissible accommodations.
1.

The Accommodation Must Relieve a Significant GovernmentImposed Burden on the Private Exercise of Religious Freedom

The challenged accommodations in Wallace and Texas Monthly failed
to meet this criterion, although they failed in subtly different ways. In Wallace,
the Court determined that any conceivable burden imposed on students by the
compulsory school day had been relieved by the previous moment of silence
provision, which set aside quiet time for students to use as they chose. 20 1 And in
Texas Monthly, the tax exemption did alleviate a financial burden on the sale of
religious publications-payment of the sales tax-but that burden was trivial,
and was indistinguishable from the burden the sales tax imposed on nonreligious publications.20 2
Even if the accommodation responds to a government-imposed burden,
however, the accommodation may still fail to satisfy this first criterion if the
response is not reasonably tailored to that burden. Although the Court has not
required a narrow tailoring of relief to the underlying burden, some reasonable
and proportional relationship between the two is required.203 In his dissenting
opinion in Schempp, for example, Justice Stewart argued that the practice of
prayer and Bible reading accommodated students who were required to attend
school, and thus were limited in their opportunities for receiving religious instruction.2° In his concurrence, Justice Brennan expressed skepticism about the
existence of any such burden, and indicated that the purported accommodation-government controlled prayer and scripture reading-lacked any reasonable connection to the alleged burden on students.20 5 In Kiryas Joel, the Court
focused primarily on the denominational favoritism represented by the accommodation, but it also determined that the state might have found other, constitutionally preferable ways to alleviate the burden imposed on the religious community.2 °
By contrast, in Amos, the Court accorded a measure of deference to
Congress in setting the terms for the accommodation of religious employers
201

Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-60 (1985). See supra notes 143-53 and accompanying

text.
202

Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1989). See supra notes 166-73 and accompa-

nying text.
203
See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1987) (assessing
the relationship between expanded religious employer exemption under Title VII and the burden
imposed on religious employers by the original, narrower Title VII exemption).
204
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 311-13 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See supra notes 123-36 and accompanying text.
205
206

Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 702-08 (1994).
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under Title VII. 20 7 The Court acknowledged that Congress could have-indeed
did at one time-provide a narrower exemption for such employers, but the present and broader accommodation, nonetheless, represented a reasonable means
of alleviating the government-imposed burden on employers because the narrower exemption had led to incomplete relief from the religious burden of complying with Title VII. 20 8
2.

The Accommodation Must Facilitate Private and Voluntary
Religious Practices

This criterion may seem obvious, but it illuminates a core aspect of accommodations. At its most basic level, an accommodation provides an opportunity for voluntary, private religious exercise. The government does not specify the content of that religious exercise, or even specify that the opportunity
created should be used for religious exercise. Thus, for example, a moment of
silence provision sets aside a time in the school day in which students may
choose to pray, but the time may equally be used by students to meditate on any
topic. The provision at issue in Wallace failed on this criterion because it attempted to specify how the moment of silence should be used.2°9 This criterion
is especially important in distinguishing accommodations from other governmental practices involving religion, such as public religious displays, which
have sometimes been defended as accommodations.21 ° Such displays are not
properly viewed as accommodations because they embody official rather than
private choices of religious content.
3.

The Accommodation Must Be Available on a Denominationally
Neutral Basis

This criterion is related to, and equally fundamental as, the requirement
that the religious practice accommodated must be private and voluntary.
Through the accommodation, the government provides an opportunity for privately chosen religious practice, but the government does not specify which
religions may avail themselves of the accommodation. The requirement of neutrality does not mean that all faiths must find the accommodation equally useful.
Some religious communities, for example, may want to participate with public
schools in a released-time program for religious instruction, like the one upheld
by the Court in Zorach, while others might elect not to do so. Some religious
prisoners may feel the need to seek accommodations under RLUIPA, while the
regimen of prison life may not impose such a need on others. What is crucial,
207

Amos, 483 U.S. at 335-36.

208

Id.

Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 72-73, 84 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 677-78 (1984) (equating "accommodation" and
"acknowledgment" of religion in upholding public display).
209
210
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however, is that the accommodation is actually available for all to use if desired.
In Kiryas Joel, the Court struck down the accommodation because it found that
the state legislature was highly unlikely to have made a similar accommodation
for other religious communities that might find themselves similarly burdened.2 1'
4.

The Accommodation Must Not Impose Significant Burdens on
Third Parties

In some respects, the basis for this criterion is the least obvious, although it dominated the Court's rulings in both Estate of Thornton and Cutter.
In his scholarly work on accommodation, Judge (then-Professor) Michael
McConnell suggested that the limit on third-party burdens relates primarily to
concerns about religious favoritism. 212 An accommodation that systematically

alleviates burdens on the religious and imposes a disproportionate cost of that
accommodation on third parties, McConnell argued, grants the protected religious exercise an improper privilege.213 The Court's decision in Estate of
Thornton, which McConnell describes as a situation in which "the burden on the
nonbeneficiaries is disproportionate to the effect on the believer,, 214 provides a
good example of this concern about favoring religion.2 15
Moreover, in some contexts, the imposition of burdens on third parties
may pressure such parties to participate in the accommodated religious activity.
This concern animated Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Zorach, in which he argued that the captivity of non-participating children created public pressure on
those children to engage in the religious instruction.2 16
The strength of this criterion is uncertain because it has been applied in
relatively few decisions. Nonetheless, it could have dramatic consequences for
certain accommodations. For example, the State of Alabama exempts religious
day care providers from state licensing requirements, 217 thus creating a significant competitive disadvantage
for secular day care centers that must satisfy
211

212

512 U.S. at 702-07.
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: an Update and a Response to the

Critics, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 685, 702,05 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell's Response to the
Critics]; Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 37-39
(1985).
213
McConnell's Response to the Critics, supra note 212, at 703.
214

Id.

215

Id.; Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709-10 (1985).

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 320-21 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also id. at
323-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting); McConnell's Response to the Critics, supra note 212, at 705 (if
schools fail to provide secular options for students who do not want to use released time for religious instruction, the state may be creating an incentive for students to participate in religious
instruction).
217
See Diana B. Henriques, Religion Trumps Regulation as Legal Exemptions Grow, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at Al (describing Alabama system of regulating day care centers).
216
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these requirements. And the land use portions of RLUIPA, which accord significant protections to religious properties from zoning and other property regulations, 218 may, in some circumstances, result in the imposition of substantial
burdens on the interests of neighboring owners and users of land.
Within the boundaries of these four criteria, the government has considerable discretion with respect to permissive accommodations of religion. In Part
IV below, we analyze the military chaplaincy in light of this paradigm of religious accommodation.
IV. THE MILITARY CHAPLAINCY AS ACCOMMODATION

In this part, we begin by describing the legally salient features of the
military chaplaincy. We then apply the Establishment Clause criteria for religious accommodations to the chaplaincy as a whole.
The "military chaplaincy" actually consists of three distinct institutions:
the Chaplains Corps of the Army, the Chaplains Corps of the Navy, and the Air
Force Chaplains Service.219 (Navy chaplains also serve the Marine Corps, Coast
Guard, and Merchant Marine.) 220 The regulations and practices of the three
institutions vary to some degree, owing at least in part to the differing missions
of the services. But all three receive their basic legal and operational form
through Department of Defense regulations, which implement the statutory authorization for the chaplaincies. 221
These regulations include two core requirements for the service chaplaincies, which are reflected in the general structure of the chaplaincies and also
in the particular tasks assigned to individual chaplains. First, chaplains are
commissioned to provide religious services in accordance with the tenets of the
religious community that endorsed them for the chaplaincy.222 Second, of equal
significance, they also provide commanders with advice and assistance in meeting the religious needs of all those for whom the commander has responsibility,
regardless of religious affiliations. 223 These two requirements-the particular218

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).

See Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 197

Fed.Appx. 718 (9th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion) (upholding constitutionality of Section II of
RLUIPA).
219

AF POLICY DIR. 52-1, supra note 10; AR 165-1, supra note 10, at para. 1-4.c; SEC'Y OF

1730.7B, RELIGIOUS MINISTRY SUPPORT WITHIN THE
(12 Oct. 2000) [hereinafter SECNAV INSTR. 1730.7B]
(Navy Chief of Chaplains as head of Chaplains Corps of the Navy).

NAVY, U.S. DEP'T OF NAVY, INSTR.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY para. 4.b.

220

SECNAV INSTR. 1730.7B, supra note 219, para. 6.

221

DOD DIR. 1304.19, supra note 8; DOD INSTR. 1304.28, supra note 9; U.S. DEP'T DEFENSE,

(03
Feb. 1988) [hereinafter DOD DiR. 1300.17].
222
AF POLICY Diw. 52-1, supra note 10, para. 3.4.2; AR 165-1, supra note 10, para. 4-4;
SECNAV INSTR. 1730.7B, supra note 219; OPNAV INSTR. 1730. ID, supra note 10, para. 5.b.(2).
DOD DIR. 1304.19, supra note 8, para. 4; AF POLICY DIR. 52-1, supra note 10, para. 3.4.1;
223
DIR. 1300.17, ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES WITHIN THE MILITARY SERVICES

AR 165-1, supra note 10, para. 4.5; OPNAV

INSTR.
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ism of a chaplain's ministry within a specific faith group, and the pluralism demanded by the obligation to assist all in need-are evident in the service of each
chaplain and provide the basic framework for understanding the chaplaincy.
In order to be eligible for service as a chaplain, candidates must meet
minimum educational qualifications (including a graduate degree), have experience in religious ministry and obtain an endorsement by a DOD-approved religious organization. 224 The endorsement certifies that the candidate is recognized by that faith group as "fully qualified"-i.e., ordained, or its functional
equivalent-for professional ministry within that faith group.225 Both the endorsing religious organization and the candidate must understand and accept the
chaplain's role within the "pluralistic environment" of the military, which includes the obligation to facilitate the free exercise of all who are served by the
chaplaincy. 6 If a religious organization subsequently withdraws its endorsement for a chaplain, that chaplain ceases to be eligible for continued service and
must seek another endorsing organization, transfer to another (non-chaplain)
position within the military or leave the military altogether.227
Chaplains serve as commissioned officers.22 8 As noted earlier, their
primary obligations are to provide religious support, including worship and pastoral care, to eligible personnel, and to provide advice and assistance to commanders on religious and related matters, including assistance in facilitating the
religious exercise of all personnel. Chaplains may also be assigned a number of
other tasks, including supervision of other chaplains and religious facilities,
counseling of individuals and families, participation in official ceremonies, and
instruction in "the moral and ethical quality of leadership. 2 29 Chaplains are
specifically forbidden by the services to undertake responsibilities that would
directly involve them as combatants or in the exercise of military command.
The services provide significant and ongoing training for chaplains in a variety
of areas, ranging from the basic expectations of military service to more adDOD INSTR. 1304.28, supra note 9, para. 6.1-4. See also Bindon, supra note 4, at 250 to 51
(on chaplaincy selection process).
225
DOD INSTR. 1304.28, supra note 9, para. 6.1.1.
226
Id. at para. 6.1.3. See also DOD DIR. 1304.19, supra note 8, para. 4.2.
227
DOD INSTR. 1304.28, supra note 9, para. 6.5.
228 Id. at para. E2.1.2. (Defining "chaplain" as "[a] commissioned officer of the Chaplain Corps
of the Army, a commissioned officer of the Chaplain Corps of the Navy, or a commissioned officer in the Air Force designated for duty as a chaplain.").
229 See AR 165-1, supra note 10, para. 4-4 to 4-5; OPNAV INSTR. 1730.1D, supra note 10, para.
5.b.(2) to (5).
230
Prohibited activity includes service as a member of a court martial tribunal. See AR 165-1,
supra note 10, para. 4-3; OPNAV Instr. 1730.1D, supra note 10, para. 5.e.(11). The Geneva
Convention classifies chaplains as non-combatants, and chaplains enjoy the protections of that
status as long as they are "exclusively engaged in the work of their ministry." Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Part II: Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked, Section I General Protection, art. 8, Terminology, para. (d), June 8, 1977, 6 U.S.T. 3114.
224
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vanced study of clinical pastoral care, military ethics and comparative religions."'
Chaplains are eligible for promotion. As they increase in rank, the balance of their duties tends to shift away from the direct provision of religious
services and toward greater administrative responsibilities within the chaplaincy. 232 Upon reaching a specified age or time in grade without promotion,
chaplains are required to resign or retire from the service, though such a requirement may be waived in special circumstances.233
As we noted earlier, the military has faced no direct and comprehensive
Establishment Clause challenge to the chaplaincy since the Katcoff decision, and
the result of any such lawsuit is highly unlikely to be any different now or in the
foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the legal justification for the chaplaincy should
be made clearer, not the least because the constitutionality of specific practices
within the chaplaincy will depend in large measure on the underlying legal justification for the institution as a whole. Consideration of the four criteria for the
234
constitutionality of religious accommodations, unpacked at the end of Part 1I,
facilitates the effort to better understand and defend the institution of the chaplaincy.
A.

Does the ChaplaincyRelieve a Government-Imposed Burden on Religious Exercise?

The court in Katcoff recognized that the legitimacy of the military chaplaincy rests on its response to the religious needs of service members. 235 The
court focused exclusively on one aspect of the religious burden on service
members-isolation from their home religious communities when deployed
overseas or to remote domestic postings.2 36 If such isolation is the sole burden
to which the chaplaincy responds, then the appellate court in Katcoff was correct

231

See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note 10, paras. 8-6, 10-1 to 10-4 (chaplain training programs).

See generally DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAM. 165-3, RELIGIOUS AcTvrriEs: CHAPLAIN TRAINING
STRATEGY (01 Sept. 1988) [hereinafter AR PAM 165-3]. See also DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAM.16517, RELIGIOUS AcTrlvmEs: CHAPLAIN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT para. 4-1 to 4-13 (11 May 1998)

[hereinafter AR PAM 165-17].
232

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-05, RELIGIOUS SUPPORT IN JOINT OPERATIONS 1-3 to 5

(09 June 2004) [hereinafter JP 1-05] (describing duties of chaplains with reference to rank). See
also AR PAM 165-17, supra note 231, para. 7-1 to 7-7.
233
See AR PAM 165-17, supra note 231, paras. 6-2 to 6-13, 7-7. See also Chaplaincy of Full
Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 293-94 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (describing Navy policy of
promotion and retention of chaplains).
234
See supra notes 201-18 and accompanying text.
235
Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 234-35 (2d Cir. 1985).
236
Id. at 235-37. The isolation is caused both by remoteness and also by the requirements of
military order and security, which prevents civilians from having ready access to soldiers in deployment. Id. at 236.
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in remanding the case for review of the scope of the chaplaincy.23 7 Even allowing for an appropriate degree of deference to the military, the ministry of chaplains in many domestic settings would be rendered constitutionally vulnerable if
isolation of service members were its sole justification.
A richer understanding of the religious burden on service members,
however, would provide a firmer constitutional footing for the chaplaincy, as
well as a more accurate picture of the chaplaincy's significance. This burden of
military service has two related dimensions. First, the military-unlike virtually
all other professions-constitutes a distinct community, providing even in domestic bases virtually all facets of ordinary life: from housing, schools, and
healthcare to shopping, recreation, and entertainment. 238 The exclusion of organized religion from that community would deprive service members and their
families of the ordinary opportunity enjoyed by civilians to have a religious
experience that is integrated into their normal lives. The military chaplaincy
responds to that burden by offering service members and their families the opportunity to participate in religious experience that is integrated with their
broader military communal life. In this sense, the chaplaincy is an equalizer,
giving religious experience the same presence in a military community as other,
secular aspects of life.
Second, the military presents service members with a range of stresses
and other experiences that are unique, especially those related to participation in
combat, which has become an ever-present reality for service members on active duty and in the reserves. These stresses may have significant effects on
service members' religious beliefs, as well as their understandings of self and
relationships with others. 239 Such stresses and the predictable moral, spiritual
and emotional reactions that follow constitute a real burden on service members,
and the government is constitutionally permitted to design a chaplaincy that
responds to such a burden. 240 An adequate response to that burden includes
chaplains who understand and share the military experience of those to whom
they minister.24'
Taken together, these two dimensions of the religious burden of military
service suggest a broader latitude for accommodation than found in the Katcoff
237

238

Id. at 238.
HUTCHESON, supra note 238. See generally, U.S. Army, Welcome to the Army Family: A

First Guide for Army Spouses and Family Members, http://www.per.hqusareur.army.mil
/FRSA/docs/welcometothearmyfamily 1.pdf.
239
Robert J. Phillips, The Military Chaplaincy of the 21st Century: Cui Bono? (unpublished
paper, originally presented at 2007 International Society for Military Ethics (copy on file with
authors and WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW)).
240
Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11, 31-33 (D.D.C. 2007).
241 The closest analogy on this point would be the chaplains of police and fire departments who
fill a similar role in those trauma-filled professions. See, e.g., Malyon v. Pierce County, 935 P.2d
1272 (Wash. 1997) (chaplaincy program in sheriff's department did not violate Establishment
Clause). But see Voswinkel v. City of Charlotte, 495 F. Supp. 588 (W.D.N.C. 1980) (police department chaplaincy violated Establishment Clause).
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analysis. The latitude remains bounded because not every facet of the chaplaincy is likely to be reasonably characterized as a response to these burdens.
But the Katcoff challenge questioned the validity of the institution as a whole,
and questioned whether the existence of a professional military chaplaincy, fully
integrated into the life of units and the broader military community, represented
a reasonable response to burdens imposed on service members' free exercise.
The richer account of such burdens suggests that the institution may fairly be
described as responsive.
B.

Does the Accommodation FacilitatePrivate and Voluntary Religious
Practice?

This criterion highlights an important difference between the military
chaplaincy and most other accommodations of religion. Other accommodations
create opportunities for private religious experience by relieving beneficiaries of
specific burdens, such as a work schedule that interferes with Sabbath observance, or a ban on wearing certain apparel that might be religiously mandated
for some people.242 As such, the accommodations typically work in the negative
by removing obstacles. In stark contrast, the military chaplaincy is a thoroughly
positive accommodation. The military may permit service members free time
for religious experience, but the chaplaincy also creates the content of such experiences through preaching, worship, religious instruction and pastoral care.243
Accommodations that serve only to create time or physical space for religious
observance readily meet the requirement that such exercises must be private and
voluntary because the entity making the accommodation is detached from the
religious experience itself.
To meet its obligations under this second criterion, the military must
show that the religious experiences provided by chaplains are responsive to the
expressed religious preferences of service members. Such a showing may be
more difficult, or at least more complicated, than it appears because the chaplaincy-like any institution-operates from its own inertia and the inclinations
and competences of its service providers, and not entirely from the articulated
desires of its "customers." Moreover, the chaplaincy certainly plays a role in
creating a demand for its services, and also in shaping which services are demanded. For example, a chaplain who socializes with troops may invite service
members to religious activities led by that chaplain. 244 The military responds to
242

Indeed, the military provides more traditional religious accommodations in the form of

exemptions from general regulations. See DOD DiR. 1300.17, supra note 221, para. 3.2.1, 3.2.6 to
3.2.7 (1988) (establishing policy on religious exemptions from work schedules and uniform re-

quirements). See also U.S. DEP'T OF NAVY,

NAVAL MILrrARY PERSONNEL MANUAL

1731-010, 2(a)

(01 Aug. 2006) [hereinafter OPNAV MANUAL 1731-010] (providing accommodation for day of
religious observance).
See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note 10, para. 4-4.a. & k. (describing duties of chaplains).
243
244

HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 71-74. See also Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 4, at 38-43

(discussing limits on religious speech by chaplains).
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this issue by providing that participation in all religious activities must be voluntary. 245alCommanders at all levels artoese
are required to ensure that service members
are not subjected to official pressure to attend religious services or otherwise
engage in religious activity. 246 Chaplains that provide non-religious services,
such as training in leadership and ethics, are prohibited from using such opportunities to engage in religious instruction, or even to urge service members to
participate in religious activities.247
The military's emphasis on voluntary participation by service members
in religious activities conforms to the requirement that accommodations must
respond to private religious needs. This conformity is even more evident in the
military's consistent message that the first duty of a chaplain is to facilitate the
free religious exercise of those who come within the chaplain's sphere of responsibility.24 8 The actual performance of religious services is a subordinated
obligation for the chaplain, one that arises in response to particular needs. 249
However, the military chaplaincy is not uniformly responsive. It retains
elements that seem more to reflect government promotion, rather than accommodation, of religion. In part, this lack of uniformity may simply reflect an
incomplete transformation of a culture within the chaplaincy toward one that is
consistently focused on accommodation. 250 For example, a document from the
Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which describes the
Army's vision for chaplaincy within "Force XXI"-the 21st century Army-offers the following account of the chaplain's role:
The Chaplaincy provides for the free exercise of religion for
soldiers, their family members, and authorized civilians in a
single seamless system. The UMT [unit ministry team] provides comprehensive RS [religious support] and presents the

245 See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note 10, para. 3-2.a. ("Participation of Army personnel in religious services is strictly voluntary.").
246
Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding unconstitutional mandatory
chapel attendance policy at military academies). See also Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th
Cir. 2003) (holding unconstitutional practice of mandatory "supper prayer" at Virginia Military
Institute).
247

See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAM. 165-16, MORAL LEADERSHIP/VALUES STAGES OF THE FAMILY

LIFE CYCLE, para. 1-2 (30 Oct. 1987) [hereinafter AR PAM 165-16] ("Chaplain instructors have a
responsibility to avoid any action, which would tend to confuse this training with religious instruction.").
248 DOD DIR. 1304.19, supra note 8, para. 4.1. See Wildhack, supra note 4, at 229-32.
249

DOD DIR. 1304.19, supra note 8, para. 4.2.

250

HUTCHESON, supra note 238,

at 82-83. See also ANNE C. LOVELAND,

AMERICAN

EVANGELICALS AND THE U.S. MILITARY 1942-1993, 296-322 (1996).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2007

33

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 10

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 110

power of God in the lives of soldiers, families, and authorized
civilians. 25'
The document continues with similar substantive theological claims
about the role of the chaplain.
The UMT represents the comfort and hope of religion and truth
in the high stress environment of military operations and frequent deployments .... Our strength as an Army mirrors the
very soul of the nation. The Chaplaincy adds the dimension of
a loving and caring God to the environment in which soldiers
and Army families live and serve. 2
It is easy, of course, to exaggerate the significance of such statements,
especially in a document that is now a decade old. Nonetheless, the sentiments
conveyed in the TRADOC paper reflect an important, if subtle, tension with the
vision of the military chaplaincy as an instrument of religious accommodation.
Those sentiments profess, in the official words of the Army, specific theological
commitments-that God exists, is powerful, has a connection to the soul of
America and cares for and loves people. Such official religious professions
cannot be justified through the model of religious accommodations outlined
above.
The Air Force makes a similar claim in a document that is more recent
and more authoritative than the TRADOC paper. Air Force Instruction 52-1
describes chaplains as "visible reminders of the Holy," 253 although it immediately links that description with chaplains' duty to facilitate the free exercise of
religion by servicemembers. Compared to substantive religious claims found in
the TRADOC paper, in which God is asserted to be powerful and loving, the Air
Force Instruction suggests only a link between chaplains and "the Holy." Nonetheless, the link represents a departure - if only the most innocuous - from the
military's responsive role, in which the military provides chaplains who receive
their religious endorsements from specific religious communities. Instead, the
Air Force assertion appears to warrant the religious authority of chaplains, and
indeed to warrant the reality of divine presence. Neither warrant is consistent
with the Establishment Clause limits on the practice of accommodation. 2 4
U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, TRAINING AND DOCTRINE PAM. 525-78, RELIGIOUS
XXI: U.S. ARMY CHAPLAIN UNIT MINIsTRY TEAMS para. 3-1a(1) (Sept. 1997).
252
Id. at para. 3-lb, 3-2a.
251

253

SUPPORT TO FORCE

U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, INSTR. 52-101, CHAPLAIN PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION

para. 2.1

(21 June 2002) [hereinafter AF INSTR. 52-1011.
254
Such an attitude seems to have been much more common prior to the Katcoff litigation. See
HuTCHESON, supra note 238, at 52 (service of religion to mission of military); Paul J. Weber, The
FirstAmendment and the Military Chaplaincy: The Process of Reform, 22 J. CHURCH & ST. 459,
464-66 (1980) (religious mission of the military accomplished through chaplaincy).
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A different challenge to the chaplaincy's responsive role arises from the
question of proselytizing by chaplains, a question left implicit in our earlier example of the chaplain who invites service members to participate in religious
activities.2 55 The issue arises within a vacuum of regulation, and even of offi256
cial guidance, covering the chaplain's engagement with service members.
Some types and situations of proselytizing are clearly prohibited, such as those
that involve harassment or assertions of official authority (although chaplains do
not exert command authority, they are commissioned officers and are as such
entitled to official respect).25 7 Chaplains are also forbidden to use their conduct
of official non-religious services, such as morale support or leadership education, as an opportunity for proselytizing. 258 Apart from such restrictions, chaplains may argue that proselytizing is an essential part of their ministry, and-as
long as performed in a non-coercive manner-is fully consistent with service
members' rights of free exercise.
Because existing regulations neither prohibit nor expressly permit such
proselytizing by chaplains, two essential questions about the constitutionality of
the practice need to be answered. First, does the Establishment Clause require
the government to prohibit non-coercive proselytizing by chaplains? Second,
does the Free Exercise Clause (or perhaps RFRA) grant to chaplains the right to
engage in proselytizing? The two questions are interdependent because an affirmative answer to either one would likely require a negative answer to the
other.
255

This question was raised most recently, and most publicly, in the controversy surrounding

religious conduct at the Air Force Academy. See generally Cook, supra note 4; Report of Americans Unitedfor Separation of Church and State on Religious Coercion and Endorsement of Religion at the United States Air Force Academy, http://www.au.org/pdf/050428AirForceReport.pdf;
Laurie Goodstein, Religious-Bias Inquiry is Set at Air ForceAcademy, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2005,
at A29; Laurie Goodstein, Air Force Chaplain Tells of Academy Proselytizing, N.Y. TIMES, May
12, 2005, at A 16. We do not address the equally-although differently-complicated question of
proselytizing by service members, but focus here exclusively on such conduct by chaplains. We
also defer for now the narrower question of a chaplain's conduct of pastoral care, which we take
up later as a distinct practice of the chaplaincy. See infra Part V.B.3.
256 The Air Force Chaplain School briefly distributed to its students a code of ethics for chaplains that was produced by the National Conference on Ministry to the Armed Forces (NCMAF),
an interfaith association that includes most of the religious bodies that endorse chaplains for the
armed services. The NCMAF ethics code states: "I will not proselytize from other religious bodies, but I retain the right to evangelize those who are not affiliated." NCMAF, Covenant and
Code of Ethics for Chaplains of the Armed Forces, http://www.ncmaf.org/
policies/codeofethics.htm. The Air Force stopped distributing the code, and said that the code was
not an official statement of Air Force policy. Alan Cooperman, Air Force Withdraws Paperfor
Chaplains: Document Permitted Proselytizing,WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2005, at A3. Chaplain Cecil
Richardson-now the Air Force's deputy chief of chaplains-endorsed the statement from the
NCMAF ethics code in an interview with the New York Times. Laurie Goodstein, Evangelicals
are a Growing Force in the Military Chaplain Corps, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2005, at Al.
257
10 U.S.C. § 3581 (1956) ("A chaplain has rank without command."). See, e.g., AR 165-1,
supra note 10, para. 4-3.a.
258
See, e.g., AR PAM 165-16, supra note 247, para. 1-2.
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With respect to the Establishment Clause, the answer would turn on the
extent to which such proselytizing might reasonably be attributed to the government, acting through its agent the chaplain. Chaplains are entitled, and are
indeed required, to conduct worship services in accordance with the dictates of
their faith. 259 The religious content of the worship services fits within the justification provided for a religious accommodation because service members
choose to participate. But where such choice is not present-or, as the chaplain
might say, not yet present-that justification is far less compelling. At best, the
government could argue that proselytizing represents nothing more than a chaplain informing service members of religious opportunities available to them.
This description is, of course, greatly weakened to the extent that the chaplain
suggests only one such opportunity, or at least the theological efficacy of only
one such opportunity.
What, then, of the chaplain's free exercise claim to engage in proselytizing? 260 This interest is significantly weaker than the government's potential
Establishment Clause liability for proselytizing by chaplains. To begin with, the
chaplain's asserted right would be judged under the standard reflected in Goldman v. Weinberger,261 which suggested extraordinary deference to military authority when service members assert free exercise claims.262 There is simply no
reason to treat chaplains differently from other service members for purposes of
applying the teachings of Goldman. Indeed, the chaplain entered the military
subject to an explicit understanding that the chaplaincy "function[s] in a pluralistic environment," and is committed "to support directly and indirectly the free
exercise of religion by all" who are authorized to receive services.26 3 A court
would accord quite significant deference to a judgment by the military that
proselytizing may cause tension and divisiveness within the ranks, and may
interfere with the chaplain's primary obligation to facilitate the free religious
exercise of service members.
C.

Is the Accommodation Available on a Denomination-NeutralBasis?

Compared to the second criterion, analysis of the third is relatively
straightforward. The chaplaincy is formally open to authorized clergy of all
faiths, subject to the requirement of having a DOD-recognized endorsing organization.2 4 Chaplains are required to facilitate all service members' free ex259

AR 165-1, supra note 10, para. 4-4.a. & e.; AF POLICY DIR. 52-1, supra note 10, para. 3.4.2;

OPNAV INSTR.1730.1 D, supra note 10, para. 5.e.(l).
260
See Rosen, supra note 4, at 1152-58.
261 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
262
Id. at 508; see also Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11, 26-28 (D.D.C. 2007) (discussing deferential standard drawn from Goldman).
DOD INSTR. 1304.28, supra note 9, para. 6.1.3.
264
The question of unlawful discrimination in DOD approval of endorsing organizations is
263

suggested by a recent dispute over a Wiccan chaplain. See Alan Cooperman, For Gods and Coun-
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ercise of religion.265 This includes direct services by military chaplains; arrangements with civilian religious leaders or lay leaders if military chaplains are
not able to meet the needs of particular faith groups; and supportive services
coordinated by chaplains, including provision of space or materials needed for
religious activities.26 6 Although it is certainly possible, and perhaps likely, that
challenges will be brought because of the military's failure to make adequate
accommodations for a particular faith group, nothing in the overall structure of
the chaplaincy suggests that the institution is designed to promote certain
faiths.267
D.

Does the Accommodation Impose Significant Burdens on Third Parties?

At first glance, assessment of this criterion would appear to proceed
along the same lines taken by the Supreme Court in Cutter, in its scrutiny of the
RLUIPA accommodation.26 8 Just as the Court in Cutter suggested deference to
prison authorities with respect to the costs of prison accommodation, courts are
likely to trust the military to protect the welfare of service members from exposure to serious burdens that might result from the accommodation. But the
analogy to prison accommodations quickly breaks down because the chaplaincy
and RLUIPA's protections for "institutionalized persons" represent different
forms of accommodation. The harms resulting from the chaplaincy might not
be the same ones attaching to RLUIPA accommodations, which find their direct
parallel in the military's standard rules on accommodation of individual religious practices.26 9
The burdens of conventional accommodation of religious practice by
service members might include, for example, increased obligations to perform
certain kinds of tasks because a fellow unit member has a religious reason for
not performing them. There is no reason to believe that the military has categorically preferred the accommodation of religious beliefs to other relevant considerations, such as familial needs, nor is there any reason to believe that a mission-oriented military would permit accommodations that generated third-party
burdens greatly disproportionate to benefits bestowed on the beneficiaries of

try: The Army Chaplain Who Wanted to Switch to Wicca? Transfer Denied, WASH. POST, Feb. 19,

2007, at C 1.
265
DOD INSTR. 1304.28, supra note 9, para. 6.1.3.
266
AF INSTR. 52-101, supra note 253, para. 3.2; AR 165-1, supra note 10, paras. 4-5, 5-5;
OPNAV INSTR. 1730.1 D, supra note 10, para. 5.b.(2).
267
In Part V.A. infra, we discuss the related and heavily litigated question of religious preferences in the selection, promotion, and retention of chaplains.
268
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722-25 (2005).
269 See generally DOD DIR. 1300.17, supra note 221 (implementing the statutory reaction to
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)).
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270
those accommodations. Accordingly, concerns present in Estate of Thornton
are not likely to arise in the military context.
Instead, the burdens at issue in evaluating the chaplaincy would be
those that result from the affirmative operation of the chaplaincy itself. To the
extent that the chaplaincy functions as an optional feature of military life, the
burdens on third parties-non-participants-are likely to be no more than minor.271 If, however, the military tolerates or approves of more assertive interactions between chaplains and service members, especially in contexts of particular vulnerability for the service members, then the harms might be seen as more
substantial. As in the case of RLUIPA's required accommodations of religious
practices in prison, the structure of the military chaplaincy does not suggest any
systematic burdens on third parties. Assertions of unconstitutional burdens on
third parties must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, rather than with respect
to the institution as a whole. Analyzed in light of its overall structure, the institution of the military chaplaincy is readily defensible as an accommodation of
religion. The military chaplaincy is capable of being conducted in a constitutional manner, even if particular practices might be vulnerable to challenge. In
what follows, we explore several such practices and analyze the circumstances
in which the organization and operation of the chaplaincy might transgress constitutional limits.

V. ACCOMMODATION NoRMS AS APPLIED TO PARTICULAR PRACTICES WITHIN
THE CHAPLAINCY
In Part V, we address two contexts within the military chaplaincy in
which significant constitutional issues have been raised. We first consider the
services' policies for accession, promotion, and retention of chaplains. We then
examine the services' regulation of particular aspects of chaplains' ministry,
including the conduct of worship, prayer at official functions, and the exercise
of pastoral care.
A.

Employment of Chaplains

For more than a decade, a series of lawsuits in the federal courts of the
District of Columbia has addressed allegations of religious preferences in the
employment of Navy chaplains.272 Although the lawsuits involve a variety of
270

Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985). See supraPart

271

See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note 10, para. 3-2a ("Participation of Army personnel in religious

11I.B.4.

services is strictly voluntary. However, Army personnel may be required to provide logistic support before, during, or after worship services or religious programs.").
272
Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In re. England, 375 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005); Larsen v. U.S. Navy,
486 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2007); Adair v. England, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006); see also
Wilkins v. U.S., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41268 (S.D. Cal. 2003). See generally, Ducoat, supra
note 4; Aden, supra note 4, Wildhack, supra note 4.
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claims, most focus on an alleged "Thirds" policy of the Navy to apportion slots
within the Chaplains Corps based on religious affiliation, with one-third each
going to Roman Catholics, "liturgical Protestants," and "non-liturgical Christians," with a small portion left for "Special Worship" (i.e., all other faith
groups).273 Such an apportionment, the lawsuits allege, is impermissible because it results in the significant over-representation of Roman Catholics and
"liturgical Protestants," and under-representation of those classified as "nonliturgical Christians, ' '274 a group that includes most evangelical Christians. This
discrimination, the lawsuits allege, pervades the personnel policies of the Navy
Chaplains Corps, from accession and promotion through retention.27 5
Chaplaincy personnel policies must function within a complex constitutional, statutory, and regulatory matrix. On the one hand, explicitly religionbased employment policies of the government are ordinarily treated as constitutionally suspect, typically requiring strict scrutiny when a matter of official policy. 276 On the other hand, the justification for a military chaplaincy rests on the

ability of chaplains to provide specific religious services to the military, so the
military has good reason to focus on the religious identity of chaplains. Reconciling these two considerations-the default prohibition on religion-based employment discrimination, and the religion-conscious needs of the military chaplaincy-represents a constitutional challenge.
One key to reconciliation appears in the standard trajectory of a military
chaplain's career. In the lower ranks, chaplains are more involved in the direct
provision of religious services, and proportionately less involved in administrative or other duties. 277 As they progress up through the ranks, the proportions
shift, and more senior chaplains tend to lack direct responsibility for provision
of religious services. 278 Promotions, thus, should arguably be religion-neutral
because they should be used to evaluate and reward the chaplain's performance
of the broader, essentially secular role of facilitating the free exercise of those
within the chaplain's responsibility.
At the time of accession, the religious identity of a chaplain is most
likely to be relevant to the military's needs. Nevertheless, as revealed by recent

273

Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 294-95; Larsen, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 15-17.

274

A court described "non-liturgical Protestants" as follows: "'non-liturgical' denotes Christian

denominations or faith groups that do not have a formal liturgy or order in their worship service.
According to the plaintiffs, these groups baptize only adults or children who have reached 'the age
of reason' and their clergy do not usually wear vestments or special religious dress during services. Referred to by some Navy chaplains as 'low church,' the non-liturgical Christian categories
include Baptist, Evangelical, Pentecostal, and Charismatic faith groups." Adair, 183 F. Supp. 2d at
36 (citations omitted). See also Aden, supra note 4, at 221-16.
275
Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 295-96.
276
Adair, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 46-50 (discussing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)).
277 JP 1-05, supra note 232, paras. 11-3 to 11-5.
278
Id.
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litigation over accession to the chaplaincy, 279 recruitment of new chaplains is
likely to be guided by a complex, service-specific calculus regarding the need to
accommodate the religious exercise of service members.
In Larsen v. U.S. Navy,28 ° the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia recently ruled in favor of the Navy in a case involving claims of religious discrimination in accession to a position as Navy chaplain. The plaintiffs
included three Protestant ministers who had complained that the Navy unlawfully favored "liturgical" Protestant ministers over "non-liturgical" Protestant
ministers like themselves. 28' "Non-liturgical" Protestant ministers are from denominations that do not use a formal liturgy or order of worship, and generally
perform adult baptism rather than infant baptism.282
When the case began several years ago, the plaintiffs alleged that the
Navy followed the "Thirds" policy described above.283 This division into thirds
may (or may not) have once matched the demography of the U.S., but the complaint alleged that the distribution did not come close to reflecting the religious
composition of the Navy by the 1990s.284 Thus, the "Thirds" policy resulted in
substantial over-representation of liturgical285 Protestants and substantial underrepresentation of non-liturgical Protestants.
The Navy did not admit that it had ever utilized the "Thirds" policy.
Even if it had once utilized that policy, however, the district court found that it
had abandoned the policy, and any challenge to it was now moot. 286 Instead, by
the time the case came to be heard on cross-motions for summary judgment, the
Navy had switched to a denomination-neutral system for accession of chaplains.287 As the district court described the current policy, the Navy no longer
tries "to link the composition of the Navy Chaplaincy to the religious denominational demographics of the community generally., 288 Instead, the Navy now
279

Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2007).

280

Id.

281

Id.at 15.

Adair, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 36. See also Aden, supra note 4, at 213.
283
See supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text. See also Larsen, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 15-16.
284
Adair, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 40-41 (describing religious demography of the Navy); Larsen, 486
F. Supp. 2d at 15-16 (alleging under-representation of non-liturgical Protestants).
285 Larson, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 16.
286
Id. at 24-25. Had the Navy openly maintained the sort of denominational preference re282

flected in the "Thirds" policy, the question of the legitimacy of such a preference would have been
squarely presented. The plaintiffs had argued, citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), that
courts must strictly scrutinize any such explicit denominational preference. Id. at 28. Whether the
desire to match the religious demography of the chaplaincy with the religious demography of the
Navy itself would have satisfied such a strict standard of review is difficult to say. Once the demography of the Navy changed in the direction of non-liturgical Protestants, however, there was
no remaining justification for the 'Thirds" beyond an illicit effort to maintain the existing distribution of power and authority in the Navy chaplaincy core.
287
Larsen, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 24-25.
288 Id. at 25.
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considers a variety of factors in determining its chaplaincy accession needs,
including:
"the breadth of locations where Navy personnel serve," "the
unique circumstances of Naval service, which involves personnel isolated on ships sailing all over the world," "the various
functions and tasks of chaplain officers outside of religious services including assistance to those of other faith groups and
even no faith groups," "the need to keep accession, promotion,
and retention in line with other naval communities," "the need
to prevent shortages of qualified clergy," "the need to maintain
capacity to respond to events requiring quick access to chaplains from different faith groups not stationed on site, such as
terror attacks," and "the need to consider 289
administrative necessities in managing an all-volunteer corps.,
In light of the Navy's explicit move away from denominational consciousness in selecting chaplains, the plaintiffs in Larsen shifted their theory of
the case.29 ° Instead of arguing that the Navy was engaging in unconstitutional
sectarian discrimination against non-liturgical Protestants, they argued that the
Navy was constitutionally obligated to take religious denomination of applicants
into account because that was the only way that the chaplaincy could be appropriately tailored to the free exercise needs of Navy personnel. 291 To put the
point slightly differently, the plaintiffs argued that the chaplaincy should be
denominationally proportionate to the religious demography of the Navy-if the
Navy as a whole was, for example, composed of one-half non-liturgical Protestants, the Navy chaplaincy should be similarly constituted.
The district court rejected this claim. First, Judge Urbina concluded that
strict scrutiny was not the appropriate standard of review for the plaintiffs'
claim of religious discrimination against non-liturgical Protestant ministers.292
Instead, the court ruled that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated such discrimination under the Navy's current system for accession to the chaplaincy. 293 The
court further rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the only justification for the
chaplaincy was the satisfaction of Navy personnel's constitutional rights of free
exercise, and that satisfaction of those rights required the Navy to tailor the
population of the chaplaincy to the religious demography of the Navy. Relying
289

Id. at 25-26 (quoting exhibits)

290

Id. at 30-33.

292

Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 26-27.

293

Id. at 28 ("[T]he plaintiffs own data shows that under the Navy's current accession policy,

291

accession rates among applicants of different faith groups have 'converged,' and any previously
existing statistical differences 'have dissipated."') (citations omitted).
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heavily on Goldman v. Weinberger,294 Judge Urbina explicitly adopted the
model of permissive accommodation:
If, as is the case here, the Navy is permitted, but not constitutionally required, to accommodate religious needs of its members via a chaplaincy program, the Navy's program need not satisfy every single service members' free exercise need, but need
only promote free exercise through its chaplaincy program. The
program is constitutionally sound if it simply works toward accommodating those religious needs.295
Applying this concept of accommodation, coupled with Goldman-type
deference to military judgment, the district court ruled that the current structure
of accession to the Navy chaplaincy is consistent with the Constitution. 296 The
concept of permissive accommodation includes a zone of discretion, within
which the government may decide how best to reconcile potentially conflicting
objectives.297 The Navy's current approach was both acceptable and preferable
to the plaintiffs' suggestion of demographic proportionality for several reasons.
First, a policy of strict proportionality would inevitably mean that small religious minorities would have "no access to clergy of their faith."2' 98 Second, a
policy of strict proportionality does not adequately respond to worship variations among faiths and individuals; some groups and individuals require intense
and frequent interaction with worship experience, while others typically make
do with much less engagement with religion and its representatives. 299 Third, in
some instances, "clergy from one religious denomination are unable to cater to
the religious needs of a service member from a different religious denomination. 30 In contrast, other clergy are able to cross denominational lines more
easily. °1
The Navy's accession policy, the court found, permits the flexibility to
cope with these exigencies. 30 2 The Navy must "consider units or installations,
rather than individuals or broad statistical representation, as the primary crite294

475 U.S. 503 (1986).

295

Larsen, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 31 (citing Arlin Adams, The Doctrine of Accommodation in the

Jurisprudenceof the Religion Clauses, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 317 (1988)).
296
Larsen, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 33-34.
297
Id. at 31-32.
298
Id. at 35. The court offered the example of Muslims who represent less than .0027 of Navy
personnel. Proportional representation would lead to only 2 Muslim chaplains in the entire Navy;
instead, the Navy seeks to have at least 10 Muslim chaplains, "to ensure access to a chaplain of
this tradition in every major geographical area." Id.
299
Id.
300

I.

301

Id.
Id. at 35-36.

302
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rion in being able to serve the cumulative total of individual requirements most
effectively. 3 °3 Once more invoking deference under Goldman, the court concluded that perfect tailoring of the chaplaincy to the free exercise needs of individual Navy personnel is probably impossible to achieve, and is not constitutionally required.3°
The Larsen opinion is a bit of a funhouse mirror. The case did not involve a conventional Establishment Clause challenge to the chaplaincy of the
sort litigated in Katcoff. Instead, the Larsen plaintiffs wanted to participate in a
chaplaincy, but they wanted it shaped in a way that would make it easier for
non-liturgical Protestant ministers to gain accession. Judge Urbina quite correctly perceived the problem; the plaintiffs wanted him to order the Navy to
remake its accession policy in the image they preferred.3 °5 To do so would be to
hold that there was only one constitutionally correct way to structure accession-that is, in line with the religious demography of the Navy. As Judge Urbina noted, if he were to order such a restructuring, the Navy would inevitably
become deeply, and perhaps unconstitutionally, involved in studying "the religious habits and interests of its service members. ' 3°
At the most basic level, Judge Urbina's opinion proceeds from the
sound insight that the military chaplaincy is a matter of permissive, not mandatory, accommodation of religious need. No free exercise rights, of either chaplains or other service members, are at stake in its structure. Instead, the constitution gives bounded discretion to all branches of the armed forces to fill the
personnel needs of the chaplaincy in ways that optimize the match between considerations of religious experience and other considerations of military efficiency. Whether or not the alleged "Thirds" policy fell within those boundaries,
Judge Urbina's decision to uphold the Navy's current policy against denominational preference, and against a concept of religious proportionality in accession,
seems constitutionally appropriate.30 7
B.

Conduct of Ministry

Several aspects of chaplains' ministry have also come under constitutional-and, in one case, quite political-scrutiny in recent years. We discuss
three in this section: the conduct of faith group worship, prayer at official ceremonies, and the exercise of pastoral care.

303

Id. at 36 (citation omitted).

304 Id. See also id. at 32 ("[T]he Navy's arguments convince the Court in their own right that
stationing a chaplain wherever a service member needs one would be a logistical nightmare the
execution of which would significantly and perpetually strain military resources.").
305
Id. at 32-33, 35-36.
306 Id. at 35-36 (noting the potential entanglement problems associated with the plaintiffs'
preferred method of accession).
307
An appeal in Larsen is no doubt forthcoming.
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Faith Group Worship

Worship, for most faiths, is the heart of religious experience; it is the
center and source from which other obligations and practices radiate. 30' The
United States Code appropriately gives the same shape to the military chaplaincy. Regulations of the Department of Defense and the individual services
specify a wide range of duties for chaplains, but the statutes command only two
acts.3° Chaplains must hold worship services and must conduct burial services.31 0
The obligation to hold worship, however, concerns the type of activity
required rather than the content of that activity. The military allows chaplains to
determine the substance of worship services, including liturgy, hymns and sermons.311 In delegating this responsibility to chaplains, the military responds to
two potential concerns. First, the military assures chaplains and their endorsing
bodies that chaplains will be free to lead worship "according to the manner and
forms of the church of which [the chaplain] is a member., 312 If chaplains control the content of worship services that they lead they will be able to avoid participation in worship practices that are inconsistent with the demands of their
particular religious traditions. Second, the delegation reflects the dual "commission" of chaplains. Although the military commissions chaplains to serve as
staff officers who are responsible for facilitating service members' free exercise,
the military does not give chaplains the authority to perform religious rites such
as administration of sacraments or conferral of blessings.31 3 That authority
308

See generally MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION

20-65 (Willard R. Trask trans, Harper & Row Publishing 1961) (1957) (religious life founded on
recognition of and entry into sacred space, as enacted in ritual).
309 AF INSTR. 52-101, supra note 253, paras. 3 to 5 (Air Force chaplain duties); AR 165-1,
supra note 10, para 4.4 (Army chaplain duties); OPNAV INSTR. 1730.1D, supra note 10, para. 5.b.
(Navy chaplain duties).
310
10 U.S.C. § 8547(a) (2000) (Air Force); 10 U.S.C. § 3547(a) (2000) (Army); 10 U.S.C §
6031(a) (2000) (Navy).
311 See, e.g., AF INSTR. 52-101, supra note 253, para. 3.2.2.2.:
Worship services may be designed by chaplains in response to a broad population possessing common beliefs and desiring a specific style of worship. The
terms "liturgical," "traditional," "contemporary," "gospel" and "praise" are
exclusively used to identify chaplain-led worship of a particular style designed
to meet the needs inclusive of several denominations and/or a broad population. Chaplain leadership ensures attentiveness to needs and sensitivity to the
diversity of those attending these worship services. Services must be advertised and promoted by style, character, and doctrinal content.
This was not always the case. Anne Loveland describes the conflict over the "Unified Protestant
Sunday School Curriculum," adopted in the 1950s. LOVELAND, supra note 250, at 85-86, 90-94.
312
10 USC § 6031(a) (Navy). See also AF INSTR. 52-101, supra note 253, at § 3.2.2.1; AR
165-1, supra note 10, para. 4.4.e.
313
HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 26.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss1/10

44

Lupu and Tuttle: Instruments of Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy and the Con

INSTRUMENTS OFACCOMMODATION

2007]

comes solely from the chaplain's religious body and the chaplain acts in the
name of that body, not in the name of the military, when leading worship.31 4
This delegation of responsibility for worship could create tension with
the underlying justification for the chaplaincy because the particular religious
commitments of chaplains might conflict with the military's broader goal of
accommodating service members' free exercise of religion. Two such conflicts
over worship have arisen in recent years-the first involving the concept of pluralism and the second involving the practice of "collective Protestant worship."
a.

The Varieties of Religious Pluralism

Department of Defense regulations require chaplains and endorsing
bodies to affirm that the ministry of chaplains takes place in a context of religious pluralism. 31 5 Army chaplain candidates are required to endorse the following statement:
While remaining faithful to my denominational beliefs and
practices, I understand that, as a chaplain, I must be sensitive to
religious pluralism and will provide for the free exercise of refamilies, and other authorized
ligion by military personnel, their
3 16
personnel served by the Army.
This injunction to "sensitivity" provides little guidance on how chaplains should
relate their individual faith commitments, which might include beliefs about the
exclusive efficacy of their faith, to the religious beliefs of others, which the
chaplain might believe to be erroneous or even sinful.
The question of pluralism became concrete in a recent lawsuit, Veitch v.
England,317 which involved a former chaplain's claim of religious discrimination.31 8 The lawsuit was brought by Reverend Veitch, an ordained minister 3in19
the Reformed Episcopal Church, who had served as a chaplain in the Navy.
Veitch alleged that his supervisor, Chaplain (Capt.) Buchmiller, who was a Roand evangelical
Protestants."'
manparticular,
Catholic Veitch
priest, was
hostile
conservative
criticized
the content
of his serIn
claimed
thattoBuchmiller
314

Id. at 26, 29.

315

DOD

DIR.

1304.19, supra note 8, para. 4.2 ("Religious Organizations that choose to partici-

pate in the Chaplaincies ... express willingness for their Religious Ministry Professionals (RMPs)
to perform their professional duties as chaplains in cooperation with RMPs from other religious
traditions.").
316
Office of the Chief of Chaplains Form 13, "Statement of Understanding of Religious Pluralism in the U.S. Army" (copy on file with authors and WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW).
317
471 F.3d 124 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
318
Id. at 125-26.
319
Id. at 125.
320
Id. at 125-27.
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mons, and especially Veitch's preaching of "sola scriptura"-adoctrine of the
supremacy of scripture to all other sources of divine authority and guidance.3 1
Buchmiller said that his criticisms were directed toward Veitch's denigration of
other chaplains, including alleged references to them as "unregenerate," rather
than to Veitch's doctrinal preaching. 322 Buchmiller told Veitch "not 'to imply
that everyone else is wrong,' or that 'you are the only source323of the truth with
implications that our other chaplains have no valid theology.'"
After a series of increasingly contentious exchanges, Veitch filed an
employment discrimination complaint. 324 The investigating officer found that
Veitch had "engaged in non-pluralistic activity as evidenced by his sermons and
his statements to the inquiry officer., 325 The officer's report gave the following
definition of pluralism:
Pluralism is a well-established doctrine encompassing both
ethical... administrative... and practical standards... in the
USN Chaplain Corps. The basic tenant [sic] of pluralism has a
long history in the Chaplain Corps .... In laymen's terms the
Navy Chaplain must minister to all faiths in such a manner to be
inclusive... to all and unoffensive ... to all Navy personnel.326
Based on the investigating officer's report, the Navy dismissed Veitch's
When relations between Veitch and Buchmiller deteriorated further,
the Navy relieved Veitch of his pastoral duties and charged him with insubordination. 328 Among other things, the charging officer's report stated that Veitch
"[w]as removed from [the] pulpit for failure to preach pluralism among religions. 3 29 Veitch resigned his commission in the Navy before his court martial
on the charges, although he later tried (unsuccessfully) to revoke his resignation.33°
In his lawsuit, Veitch alleged that his resignation had been coerced
through violations of the Establishment, Free Exercise and Speech Clauses of
claim. 327

321

Veitch v. England, No. 00-2982, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6257, *6-*9 (D.D.C.) (aff'd, 471
F.3d 124 (D.C. Cir. 2006). On the Reformation doctrine of "scripture alone," see MARTIN
LUTHER, SMALCALD ARTICLES, Art. 2, 1.15, in THE BOOK OF CONCORD: THE CONFESSIONS OF THE

EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH 295, 304 (Robert Kolb & Timothy J. Wengert eds., Charles

Arand trans et.al. (2000)).
322
Id. at *6-*7, *31-32.
323
Id. at *8 (quoting an e-mail from Buchmiller to Veitch, Nov. 13 1998).
324

Id. at *9.

325

Id. at *10.

326

Id.

327
329

Id. at * 16.
Id. at *17-*20.
Id. at *19.

330

Id. at *21.

328
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the Constitution, as well as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and
other statutory protections. 33' At bottom, Veitch argued that the "pluralism"
enforced by his Navy superiors represented an unconstitutional "establishment
of religion," and that the Navy's sanctions against him for failing to comply
with this official orthodoxy violated his rights to practice his religious beliefs
"according to the manner and forms" of the religious body that endorsed his
33 2
ministry.

The district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
avoided, on slightly different grounds, what they acknowledged to be the difficult set of constitutional questions raised by Veitch's claim of mandatory pluralism. 333 The courts determined that the Navy did not coerce Veitch's resignation,
and therefore he33had
4 suffered no personal injury from the Navy's policy on religious pluralism.
The court in Veitch may have avoided the difficult constitutional questions, but the issues are likely to return. From the facts in the case, the Navy's
policy of religious pluralism can be assigned a range of possible meanings, each
with slightly different constitutional implications. We describe the outer
boundaries of this range as "maximal" and "minimal" pluralism.
i.

Maximal Pluralism

This most robust understanding of pluralism seems to be reflected in the
charging officer's finding that Veitch "was removed for failure to preach pluralism among religions. 335 Although the officer did not elaborate on the duty to
"preach pluralism among religions," it might be taken as a theological truth
claim, asserting the equal validity of all faith commitments.33 6 This truth claim
of maximal pluralism could be a subtle form of universalism, such as that captured by the sentiment that "we are all on different paths with the same destination. 337 Alternatively, maximal pluralism might rest on a more relativistic assertion that all faith traditions rest on equally unverifiable, subjectivist beliefs.33 8
at *1-*2.

331

Id.

332

Id. See also Aden, supra note 4, at 225-229.

Veitch, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6257, at *48-*53 (ruling that Veitch lacked standing to raise
the constitutional claim); Veitch, 471 F.3d at 131-32 (ruling that the Navy acted reasonably in
denying Veitch's request to withdraw his resignation).
334
Veitch, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6257, at *26-*53; Veitch, 471 F.3d at 127-32.
335
Veitch, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6257, at *19.
336 See generally Paul Otterstein, Theological Pluralism in the Air Force Chaplaincy, MIL.
CHAPLAINS REV. 89 (Fall 1987).
337
Id. at 110-11 (discussing JOHN HICK, GOD HAS MANY NAMES (1980)). See also GEORGE A.
LINDBECK, THE NATURE OF DOCTRINE: RELIGION AND THEOLOGY IN A POSTLIBERAL AGE 22-23,
52-53 (Westminster Press 1984) (discussing universalist implications of expressive-experientialist
models of faith).
338
Id. at 109. This form of pluralism is better characterized as religious relativism in that it
recognizes essential differences between faiths, but denies that any one faith is-or could
333
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In both its universalist or relativist modes, however, maximal pluralism
repre39
sents a substantive and highly contested set of religious commitments.
Officially compelled proclamation of these religious commitments
would raise serious problems under both the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses. 34° The establishment questions return us to the framework of accommodation, which provides the warrant for government-sponsored religious activity.34' Viewed in that light, the chief issue raised by the concept of maximal
pluralism is whether the affirmative obligation to preach a specific religious
message responds to a government-imposed burden on free exercise. The identity of any such burden escapes our imagination. Instead, the Navy's purported
duty to "preach pluralism" would likely arise from just the sort of problem underlying the Veitch lawsuit-religious conflict among chaplains and service
members exacerbated by inflammatory preaching. The mandate of preaching
pluralism, then, would turn the religious message into an instrument of military
policy. While the goal may be laudable, the intentional, governmental promotion of specific religious messages to further policy goals violates a core component of the non-establishment guarantee. In promoting specific religious doctrines, the government has essentially proclaimed itself competent to judge the
religious superiority of such doctrines. 4 Regardless of the secular efficacy of
the doctrines, this course of action is a violation of government's constitutional
obligation of neutrality among religions, as well as its jurisdictional limitation to
temporal matters.34 3
An affirmative duty to "preach pluralism" would also be seriously vulnerable to free exercise or free speech challenges by chaplains. The strength of
these claims, however, depends on a closer examination of the peculiar role held
by military chaplains. Apart from that role, the First Amendment would undoubtedly prohibit the government from requiring religious leaders to profess a
specific doctrine.?" In addition to the Establishment Clause objections disbe-superior to another.

WILLIAM R. HUTCHISON, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN AMERICA: THE

CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF A FOUNDING IDEAL 233-240 (Yale University Press 2003); LINDBECK,
supra note 337, at 48-49 (on possible incommensurability of religious languages).
339 See generally LINDBECK, supra note 337, at 1-26.
340
The free exercise problems would implicate speech clause concerns about compelled speech
as well. See generally Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147 (2006).
341
See supra notes 201-18 and accompanying text (describing the general framework for assessing religious accommodations).
342
Madison's Memorial & Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), specifically criticizes
any government policy which makes "the Civil Magistrate ... a competent Judge of Religious
truth," because such a policy "is an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of
Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world ..... Id. at 41 n.31, 67.
343
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order,47 VILL. L. REv. 37, 83-84 (2002).
W4 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
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cussed above, the requirement would also constitute "compelled speech," which
is tested against a very strict constitutional standard. 3 To justify such compulsion, the government must show that its speech requirement is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest. 346 While the avoidance of interreligious conflict within military units might well be considered a
compelling government interest, especially in light of courts' traditional deference to military judgments in such matters, the mandatory preaching of religious
pluralism is unlikely to be accepted as the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest. Military officials have many other and less intrusive means of
addressing religious conflict short of mandating proclamation of specific religious messages.347 Unless all those means were shown to be unavailing, courts
would be very unlikely to uphold the practice.
The religious speech of military chaplains, however, is not identical to
the religious speech of private persons because chaplains conduct worship in the
course of their official military duties. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,348 the Supreme
Court recently held that a government employee does not enjoy First Amendment protections when the speech in question is directly job-related. 349 Garcetti
suggests that the speech of chaplains, even in worship, might be construed as
expression by the government rather than private expression.350 If that view
holds, the problem of compelled speech disappears. Whatever the authority of
government to compel private parties to speak, the First Amendment is no bar to
the government ordering its own agents to deliver particular messages.
Even if Garcetti undermines the free speech objection to compelling
chaplains to preach a message of religious pluralism, however, chaplains have
other potential objections to such compulsion. First, the government assures
chaplains and their endorsing agencies that, in the words of the Army regulation, "[c]haplains will not be required to take part in worship when such participation is at variance with the tenets of their faith. 351 If a chaplain's religious
commitments conflict with proclamation of the message of robust religious plu345 See generally Alexander, supra note 340.
346 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715-17.

347 Such means could include, for example, mandatory training of all personnel in interreligious sensitivity, or rigorous enforcement of norms against religious discrimination.
348 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
id. at 1960-62.
Id. at 1960 ("Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created."). We recognize the limits and complexity of this claim. Unlike the government lawyer at issue in Garcetti, military chaplains engage in religious expression on behalf of
specific individuals who voluntarily attend the chaplains' services. In this respect, the government's actual interest in the expression of chaplains is less direct than its interest in the expression
of lawyers who represent the government-the expression of chaplains serves the needs of the
government to the extent that it responds to the religious needs of service members.
351 AR 165-1, supra note 10, at para. 4.4.e.
"
350
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ralism, the military would seem bound to respect its original promise-although
that might result only in the chaplain's excused absence from preaching or leading worship.
Second, and more importantly, the religious content of faith group worship renders such speech fundamentally different from ordinary acts of government employees' job-related expression. One district court decision, Rigdon v.
Perry,352 takes a broad view of this distinction between the speech of chaplains
and that of other government employees. 353 In Rigdon, military chaplains challenged a ruling that prohibited them from urging chapel parishioners to lobby
members of Congress about pending antiabortion legislation.35 4 The court held
that the religious speech of chaplains, delivered to congregants, does not represent the use of official authority to engage in partisan political authority be355 Uscause, in that context, chaplains do not speak in any "official" capacity.
ing the same standard that would be applied to content-based regulation of private speech, the court ruled that the restrictions at issue were not the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling governmental interest and invalidated
the restrictive ruling.356
Despite the language in Rigdon, the decision does not stand for the
proposition that the speech of chaplains in faith group worship is equivalent, for
purposes of constitutional analysis, to private religious speech.357 Instead, the
decision interprets specific restrictions on the content of official speech and
finds that the policies underlying the restrictions- do not apply to the religious
speech of chaplains in the context of faith group worship. The policies at issue
involved concerns about undue influence by military superiors and the public
perception of a politicized military. 358 The court ruled that chaplains do not
exercise military command authority, and thus do not present the risk of undue
influence that justified the regulation. 359 The court also dismissed the military's
concerns about the political involvement of chaplains, finding that the services

352

962 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1997).

353 Id. at 159 ("While military chaplains may be employed by the military to perform religious
duties, it does not follow that every word they utter bears the imprimatur of official military authority ....").It is important to note, however, that the military has significantly amended the
regulations on which the Rigdon court relied for this argument. Compare the regulations cited id.
at 159, with current versions of AR 165-1, supra note 10, para. 4.3 to 4.4 (eliminating reference to
the representative role of chaplains).
354
Rigdon, 962 F. Supp. at 159.
355 Id. at 159-160.
356
Id. at 161-62.
357 Indeed, in Veitch, the D.C. Circuit panel expressly questioned Rigdon's conclusion about
the official status of chaplains. 475 F.3d at 130 (distinguishing "Rigdon, even if correctly decided
(which we doubt) ...").
358 Rigdon, 962 F. Supp. at 156-159.
359

Id. at 160.
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regularly tolerate more robust political expression than the chaplains' conduct at
issue in the case.36 °

A chaplain's speech in faith group worship, then, falls in a unique netherworld between a government employee's job-related speech (restrictable under Garcetti) and the expression of a private individual (protected against compulsion by Wooley and Barnette). As such, the military may well have a degree
of latitude in restricting the content of chaplains' religious speech-even in faith
group worship-but the restrictions will need to relate specifically to the chaplain's government-sponsored role. In other words, the chaplain acts as an agent
of the government even in the course of faith group worship, but the agency
relationship is limited to the purpose of accommodating service members' free
exercise of religion.36 1 If the chaplain's religious speech undermines or otherwise departs from that purpose, the military should be able to take remedial action without needing to satisfy the strict scrutiny applied in Wooley or even
Rigdon.

Seen in light of that modified speech inquiry, the requirement to
"preach religious pluralism" represents a closer case than the restrictions on
political activity in Rigdon v. Perry. Chaplains may not exercise the type of
command that invites concerns about undue influence, but chaplains are responsible for facilitating all service members' access to religious experience, and the
military may appropriately conclude that such responsibility requires an attitude
of equal respect for all faiths, manifest in all of the chaplain's activities.
Whether or not a chaplain's statutory or constitutional rights preclude
the military from ordering him or her to lead worship in a particular, pluralistic
way, we think that the Establishment Clause forbids the proclamation of an official theology of the armed forces, whether it be Christianity, religious pluralism
or a crude claim that God supports the military policies of the United States. If
we are correct about this, courts would not have to reach the questions of a
chaplain's rights under any other source to enjoin the imposition of a duty to
preach such an official theology.
ii.

Minimal Pluralism

If the context of preaching in faith group worship represents the maxiclaim
of required pluralism, the minimal claim involves what might better
mal
be called an attitude of "pragmatic pluralism," manifest in aspects of the chaplain's role outside of faith group worship. Unlike the maximal version, the
minimal obligation does not require affirmative assent to or expression of theological truth claims. Instead, the minimal obligation focuses on the chaplain's
performance of specific acts, such as the maintenance of working relationships
with fellow chaplains, and the chaplain's diligence in facilitating all service
360

Id. at 162.

361

Contrast with Rigdon, in which the court suggests that speech of chaplain in worship should

be characterized as private speech within a limited public forum. Id. at 162-65.
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members' religious needs on an equal basis. This minimal or pragmatic understanding of pluralism was also manifest in Veitch v. England because the military alleged that Veitch denigrated other chaplains and other faiths even outside
of faith group worship, and failed to cooperate in projects of shared ministry.362
In stark contrast to the constitutional vulnerability of maximal pluralism, the pragmatic version rests on a solid constitutional foundation. As noted
earlier, chaplains and their endorsing bodies affirm that military chaplaincy
takes place in a religiously pluralistic environment, and that chaplains are expected to respect and further the free exercise interests of all service members
without regard to specific religious commitments.3 63 A chaplain that denigrates
other faiths and undermines the ministry of fellow chaplains acts in direct contradiction to the basic justification for the chaplaincy itself. In requiring chaplains to practice "pragmatic pluralism," the military does not establish a particular version of religious truth, but instead directs its officers to perform the legitimate secular work of accommodating religion.
Free exercise or speech claims by chaplains challenging pragmatic pluralism would be similarly weak, at least outside the context of faith group worship. Although we questioned the application of Garcetti to faith group worship, the reasoning adopted by the Court should apply without reservation to the
official conduct of chaplains outside of such worship. 36 When chaplains engage in professional activities outside of worship and related religious activities
such as instruction and counseling, their role as agents of the military takes
precedence over those aspects of the role more properly seen as a delegation
from their religious bodies. In these broader professional activities, the jobrelated speech of chaplains should be under the same strict controls as jobrelated speech of other military officers.
A chaplain might assert that RFRA, which prohibits the federal government from substantially burdening religious exercise unless the burden is
necessary to accomplish a compelling governmental interest, protects his or her
right to resist the dictates of minimal pluralism and its corollary of equal religious respect for all service members. 365 RFRA-based arguments by chaplains
would fail, however, for want of a substantial burden, or on the strength of the
government's interest in avoiding disharmony among service members. 366 A
362

Veitch, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6257, at *36-*38.

363

DOD INSTR. 1304.28, supra note 9, para. 6.1.3.

364

See supranotes 348-61 and accompanying text.

Indeed, this is the best way to interpret Veitch's underlying claim in his lawsuit-a claim
that did not need to be reached because of his resignation from the Navy. Veitch, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6257, at *49-*50.
This assumes, of course, that a court would apply RFRA's ordinary standards to a case
366
involving the military. But there is every reason to believe that the more lenient standard of
Goldman v. Weinberger, which provides great deference to military judgments, would govern
application of RFRA in the military context because RFRA is designed to restore religious liberty
to its pre-Smith status, and that status includes Goldman deference. See Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486
F. Supp. 2d 11, 25-30 (D.D.C. 2007).
365
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chaplain who originally agrees to work within a religiously pluralist environment is not likely to receive a sympathetic hearing if the chaplain later asserts
that conscientious performance of religious duties requires active denigration of
other chaplains or faiths. The voluntary acceptance of the role undercuts the
idea that the limits imposed on the chaplaincy constitute a "substantial burden"
on the religious freedom of its occupants.367
Even if a court agreed that a mandatory practice of pragmatic pluralism
constitutes a substantial burden on the chaplain's religious exercise, the court
would certainly find that the government has a compelling interest in prohibiting
religious disparagement by those commissioned to facilitate religious practices
of all service members. Such disparagement could reasonably be seen as a
threat to the cohesion of military units, and also as an obstacle to service members' access to religious services, especially if the chaplain's disrespectful attitude leads service members to avoid seeking his or her assistance, or the assistance of other chaplains. Unlike the concerns at issue in Rigdon, these threats
are concrete, significant and closely related to the restrictions imposed on chaplains' expression.368
iii.

Pragmatic Pluralism in the Context of Faith

Group Worship
The most difficult and interesting questions arise in the context of faith
group religious activities and involve express or implied denigrations of other
faiths. If the military may not require chaplains to embrace religious pluralism
as a theological truth claim, may the military nonetheless prohibit chaplains
from disparaging other faiths in the course of faith group worship or instruction?
This issue is most likely the one that would have been litigated had Veitch been
granted standing to bring his constitutional challenges. 369 Although the investigating and charging officers (who were line officers, not chaplains) asserted the
more robust form of pluralism, Veitch's chaplain supervisor seemed to assert a
more modest form.37° In response to Veitch's claim that he was being disciplined for preaching the doctrine of sola scriptura, the supervisor, Buchmiller,
said, "Ihad no problem with Sola Scriptura as long as he was not being divisive
and destroying the reputation of the other chaplains. 3 71
367

See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 925-26 (Cal. 1996)

(obligation to rent on equal terms to unmarried couples imposed no substantial burden on landlord's free exercise because landlord's religion did not compel her to provide rental housing, and
she was free to withdraw from the rental housing market and invest her resources elsewhere).
368
Rigdon v. Perry, 962 F. Supp. 150, 162 (D.D.C. 1997) (chaplains' speech about the morality
of pending abortion legislation does not present a credible threat to the "loyalty, discipline, or
morale of [the] troops").
369
Veitch, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6257, at *4-*6.
at

370

Id.

371

Id. at *7.

*6-*7.
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Buchmiller's response demonstrates the challenge of enforcing pragmatic pluralism in the worship setting. Veitch asserted that his faith required
the preaching of "scripture alone," but the doctrine-a core commitment of the
Protestant Reformation-necessarily implies the error of other faith traditions,
most specifically that of Roman Catholicism, which recognizes a broader
ground of religious authority.7 Thus, the complaint that Veitch's preaching
was "anti-priest" likely reflects the chaplain's rejection of religious authority as
mediated by the church, a proclamation wholly bound up with another core conviction of the Reformation, sola gratia("by grace alone"), which also rejects the
mediation of ecclesial authority.37 3
The Protestant-Roman Catholic division reflected in Veitch is hardly
anomalous. Most faith traditions define themselves, at least in part, through a
denial of other beliefs. From the Shahadah said by Muslims to the Shema of
Jews to the Athanasian Creed (Quicumque vult) of Christians, confessions explicitly or implicitly commit adherents to disavow other faiths.374 Of course, the
manner in which a chaplain preaches or teaches the exclusivist message is likely
to be the trigger for military regulation or discipline, not the mere fact that the
chaplain has asserted the exclusive efficacy of one faith tradition. For example,
the military might not attempt to regulate the recitation of creeds, liturgy or
scripture verses that contain exclusivist claims, but might have a different attitude toward chaplains that overtly and specifically condemn the faith traditions
of others. A particularly vivid example of the latter would be Martin Luther's
depiction of the Roman Catholic Church, and especially the office of the papacy, as the "Whore of Babylon. 37 5
Was Chaplain Buchmiller on solid constitutional ground when he admonished Veitch not to preach exclusivist doctrine in a manner that was "divisive" and "destroy[ed] the reputation of other chaplains"?3 76 We described
above the proper framework for judicial review of such a question.37 7 While
leading faith group worship, the chaplain is simultaneously an agent of an endorsing organization-and thus a private individual-and an officer of the government. Although the specific religious acts in worship are not attributable to
372

JAROSLAV PELIKAN, 4 THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION: REFORMATION OF CHURCH AND DOGMA

(1300-1700) 167-82 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1983).
373 Id. at 138-55.
374

JAROSLAV

PELIKAN,

CREDO:

HISTORICAL AND

THEOLOGICAL

GUIDE TO CREEDS AND

186-215 (Yale Univ. Press 2003) (on creedal
anathemas). See also id. at 330-35 (on the Shema of the book of Deuteronomy); OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF ISLAM 286 (John L. Esposito ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2003) (on the Shehadah of
Islam).
CONFESSIONS OF FAITH IN THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION

375

JAMES M. KrrrELSON, LUTHER THE REFORMER: THE STORY OF THE MAN AND HIS CAREER

276-77 (Fortress Press 2003); BERNARD LOHSE, MARTIN LUTHER: AN
AND WORK 88-89 (Robert C. Schultz trans., Fortress Press 1986).
376
Veitch, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6257, at *7.

INTRODUCTION TO

HIS LIFE

377 See supra notes 341-61 and accompanying text.
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the government, the government nonetheless retains an important interest in
how the chaplain's role is conducted. In other words, the chaplain remains an
instrument of government policy even in the act of leading faith group worship.
The policy, broadly stated, is the government's purpose of accommodating service members' religious exercise in a way that does not cause destructive disharmony within the service. 378 The government, acting through military superiors, may regulate all facets of the chaplain's performance in order to ensure that
the chaplain is meeting the religious needs of service members, and doing so
within the religiously pluralist environment of the military.
Thus, Veitch's supervisor would have two independent grounds for admonishing the chaplain for his divisive proclamation of exclusivist doctrines.
First, the military has an interest in ensuring that the religious convictions of all
service members are accorded equal respect; pastoral injunctions to denigrate
the beliefs of others may create an atmosphere of religious intolerance. Second,
the military has an interest in maintaining "individual and unit readiness, health
and safety, discipline, morale, and cohesion., 379 Divisive preaching and religious instruction may pose a legitimate threat to unit morale and cohesion, especially if the religious claims relate to the moral character and trustworthiness of
non-adherent fellow service members.
To justify regulation of a chaplain's conduct in faith group worship, the
military would need to show that the specific manner of proclamation, and not
merely the content of the doctrine, materially harmed or threatened the military's interests. Such regulation would not present the establishment clause
problems noted in connection with maximal pluralism because the military
would not be requiring chaplains to preach a specific doctrine, or even forbidding proclamation of a faith tradition's exclusivist confession. Instead, the military would only specify that proclamations must not specifically denigrate the
religious beliefs of others.380
Free exercise or free speech claims by chaplains opposed to such restriction likely would be resolved on the question of the government's interest in
regulating the speech, and on the specific means used to further that interest. In
this respect, the traditional concerns about mechanisms for regulating speech,
such as the clarity of the restriction, the extent of discretion accorded to officials
charged with regulating the speech and opportunities for prompt review of offi378

Seen in this light, the chaplaincy falls under the military's general policy for accommoda-

tion, as reflected in DOD Din. 1300.17, supra note 221. This directive limits any accommodations that would "have an adverse impact on military readiness, unit cohesion, standards, or discipline." Id. at para. 3.1. In Larsen v. U.S. Navy, the court emphasized the chaplain's role as an
instrument of the government's permissive accommodation of service members' religious needs a role that circumscribes the chaplain's assertion of his or her own rights to religious liberty in the
exercise of that office. 486 F. Supp. 2d 11, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2007).
379 DOD DIR. 1300.17, supra note 221, para. 4.1.1.
380 For a vigorous defense of the idea that the Establishment Clause forbids governmentsponsored denigration of anyone's religious beliefs, see CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE
G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 124-128 (Harvard Univ. Press 2007).
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cials' decisions, would all be important. Those concerns, however, are more
likely to involve the manner in which the military implemented the restriction,
rather than the possibility that some type of restriction could withstand substantive constitutional scrutiny. Buchmiller may well have stood on solid ground in
his admonitions to Veitch.
b.

Collective Protestant Worship

The practice of faith group worship raises a very different set of constitutional questions in the context of a common practice, the "Collective Protestant" worship service. 381 Because of the broad array of Protestant denominations, it is sometimes impossible-and frequently inefficient-to plan regular
chapel worship for a single Protestant denomination, or to prepare for distinctive
rites such as baptism or confirmation.382 Instead, chapel programs typically
offer a "Collective Protestant" worship service in which a chaplain from one
denomination leads worship for congregants representing a broad array of traditions.383 It is possible, and perhaps even likely for chaplains coming from
smaller denominations, that none of the congregants would be from the chaplain's faith group.
The constitutional issues surrounding Collective Protestant worship all
stem from the one distinctive feature of the practice: there is no religious body
called "Collective Protestantism," so the military chaplaincy creates a religious
community, and in the process decides on the hymnody and liturgy of this military religious community. 384 This contrasts sharply with Roman Catholic worship, and to a somewhat lesser degree with Jewish and Orthodox Christian worship, all of which involve forms and content of worship that are proscribed by
tradition or ecclesial authority outside the military.38 5 In our earlier discussion
of the chaplain's role in leading worship we focused on the extent to which the
chaplain derived religious authority from an endorsing body, not from the government. When the military determines, however, that worship should be conducted in a way that includes a wide range of Protestant denominations, the institutional responsibility for the worship might reasonably be thought to shift
from the chaplain's endorsing body to the military chaplaincy itself. Such a
381

HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 86-87; Kenneth W. Bush, Military Worship Wars: Blended

Worship

as

a

Pastoral Response,

THE

ARMY

CHAPLAINCY

(Winter-Spring

2003),

http://www.usachcs.army.mil/TACarchive/ACwinspr03/bush.htm; S. David Chambers, The Protestant Problem, MILITARY CHAPLAINS REvIEw 81, 84-85 (Fall 1987); Wildhack, supra note 4, at
234-35.
382
Different faith groups may gather separately and regularly for special occasions. Chambers,
supra note 381, at 83-84.
383
HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 87.
384
Chambers, supra note 381, at 84-85.
385
Larsen, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (on difference between worship needs of Protestants and
Roman Catholics).
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shift would render the chaplaincy more vulnerable to establishment clause challenge because it suggests that the government has become the author of religious experience, rather than simply the provider of opportunities for religious
experiences authored or directed by others.
Although the concern is theoretically reasonable, the actual practice of
Collective Protestant worship suggests that the concern is misplaced, or at least
overstated. Chaplains themselves determine the form of worship that a particular Collective Protestant worship service will use.386 The military does not specify an order of worship, liturgy or set of hymns, although the chaplaincy publishes worship materials with options that chaplains may select. 387 Chaplains
may adopt materials exclusively from their own tradition, but they generally
select worship styles that will appeal to congregants from a wide array of denominations. 388 As Hutcheson notes, "The fact that most Protestant chaplains
do make such adjustments is not an indictment but an indication of their desire
to minister effectively. ' '389 He goes on to suggest that the Collective Protestant
worship services reflects the present widespread permeability between Protestant denominations in the broader society, along with the growing number and
size of non-denominational Protestant congregations. 390 The significant diversity of worship styles even within a single Protestant denomination reinforce
Hutcheson's sense that the Collective Protestant worship experience mirrors the
existing shape of American Protestant worship.39 1
The practice is somewhat complicated when the Collective Protestant
worship service involves multiple chaplains, with a superior making the final
judgment about particular elements of the worship. Those disagreements might
include preferences for greater or less formality in worship, the use of traditional
hymns and musical accompaniment or contemporary songs and instrumentation,
the frequency and practice of administration of sacraments, or a wide variety of
other aspects of worship.392 Such a "command decision" on the content of Collective Protestant worship, however, does not indicate an official establishment
of "Collective Protestantism." Instead, it demonstrates just one among many
local and shifting settlements about how the worship should be conducted, arrangements that will shift further when existing chaplains depart and new chap386

Bush, supra note 381; Chambers, supra note 381, at 84-85, 88.

387

ARMED FORCES CHAPLAINCY BOARD, BOOK OF WORSHIP FOR UNITED STATES FORCES 574-90

(1974) (different versions of "Order of Worship, Protestant").
388
Bush, supra note 381 (on homogenizing pressures within "General Protestant Worship");
Chambers, supra note 381, at 85-86 (tradition of appeal to broad consensus within Protestantism
may have fractured).
389
HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 86.
390
Id.
391

See generally JAMES F. WHITE, PROTESTANT WORSHIP: TRADITIONS IN TRANSITION

(West-

minster John Knox Press 2006); RONALD P. BYARS, THE FUTURE OF PROTESTANT WORSHIP:

BEYOND THE WORSHIP WARS (Westminster John Knox Press 2002).
392 Wildhack, supra note 4, at 221.
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lains arrive. These shifting practices should be driven primarily by an assessment of the needs of the worshiping community, although the chaplain will inevitably interpret those needs through the prism of the chaplain's own religious
experience and faith tradition.393 Seen in this light, the Collective Protestant
worship reflects a reasonable attempt by the military chaplaincy to respond to
the diverse worship needs of Protestant Christians. Indeed, many chapels now
offer a range of Collective Protestant worship experiences, including Praise (or
Contemporary), Gospel (traditionally African-American), Liturgical and Hispanic Protestant.39 4
Chaplains may be excused from participating in Collective Protestant
worship if they object, on grounds of religious conscience, to the form or content of the worship.395 Nonetheless, even Protestant faith traditions that have a
long history of denominational distinctness often find ways in which their clergy
may lead Collective Protestant worship. The practices of the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod (LCMS) provide an especially useful example. The LCMS is
well known for its opposition to current trends in Protestant ecumenism, which
seeks to reduce or eliminate the distinctiveness of Protestant groups and has
been especially influential among the "mainline" churches. 396 In recent years,
the LCMS made national headlines when it sought to discipline one of its pastors, Rev. Dr. David H. Benke, for his participation in an interfaith prayer services in the days following the September 11, 2001, attacks. 397 Benke was
charged with syncretism, for publicly praying with non-Christians and implying
the equality of faiths. 398 He was also charged with unionism, for praying with
Christians outside the Lutheran confession and implying the equal truth of all
Christian confessions. 399 Although Benke was later acquitted of the charges, the
episode reveals the depth of the LCMS tradition against participation in worship
with non-Lutherans. 4°°

393

HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 87.

394

Chambers, supra note 381, at 83-84.
Id. at 86-87.

395
396

See generally LUTHERAN CHURCH-MISSOURI SYNOD, THE LUTHERAN UNDERSTANDING OF

http://www.lcms.org/graphics/assets/media/CTCR/chfellfinal.pdf (discussing LCMS understanding of relationships among
Christian church bodies).
397
Daniel J. Wakin, Seeing Heresy In a Service For Sept. 11; PastorIs Under Fire For Interfaith Prayers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at BI. See also Daniel J. Wakin, Preparingto Take on
His Church, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2002, at B3.
398 Alan Cooperman, New York Lutheran Leader Suspended; Synod Seeks Pastor'sApology for
Praying With 'Pagans'AfterSept. 11 Attacks, WASH. POST, July 6, 2002, at A2.
399 Id.
4W
Associated Press, Lutheran PanelReinstates PastorAfter Post-9/11 Interfaith Service, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2003, at B4.
CHURCH FELLOWSHIP: A REPORT ON SYNODICAL DISCUSSIONS (2001),
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Nonetheless, the LCMS has created a pattern of ministry for its endorsed military chaplains that makes significant room for pluralist practices. 40
The Synod's guidelines endorse the participation of LCMS chaplains in cooperative ministry with other chaplains "[a]s long as a LCMS chaplain is not directed to do anything contrary to the Holy Scriptures and the Lutheran Confessions. ''4 2 Specifically, the LCMS chaplain may support or supervise the work
of other, non-Lutheran chaplains, provide pastoral care to all service members
and their families and facilitate the religious exercise of those of any faith.4 °3 As
long as the elements of worship do not contradict the church body's confessions,
LCMS chaplains may lead Collective Protestant services. 4°4 The LCMS chaplaincy guidelines limit this cooperation in two ways: LCMS chaplains should
not lead worship, or participate in other religious services, with non-Lutheran
clergy; and LCMS clergy should only lead communion services for Lutheran
congregations. 405 Thus, LCMS clergy can lead Collective Protestant services so
long as the services do not involve shared pastoral leadership with non-Lutheran
clergy, and as long as the service does not include communion. 4°6 The guidechaplains who can fulfill
lines urge LCMS chaplains to "cooperate with other
40 7
denominational needs that they are unable to meet.,
Finally, the LCMS guidelines remind chaplains that, as a matter of the
regulations covering chaplains in all branches of the military, they may decline
to perform any religious acts that are contrary to the teachings of their faith.40 8
This right of all chaplains to object, on grounds of religious conscience, to participation in assigned religious tasks is an important aspect of the practice of
Collective Protestant worship. 4°9 This practice rests on voluntary cooperation
by chaplains-and of course by congregants-in designing and participating in
a worship service that typically includes parts of worship that are broadly shared
among Protestant churches.410
In this respect, the service represents a conscious tradeoff by both the
chaplaincy and the military parishioners. They exchange the distinctiveness, but
likely small numbers, of worship restricted to a particular denomination, for the
diverse and more broadly attended experience of Collective Protestant wor401
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Id. at 33-34. See also HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 50.
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See AF INSTR. 52-101, supra note 253, at sec. 2.1; AR 165-1, supra note 10, at sec. 4-4.e.;
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ship.4 11 Chaplains remain willing to facilitate, where possible, the distinctive
practices of Protestant bodies, as of other faith groups, but the Establishment
Clause permits the military to facilitate arrangements for worship that involve
non-distinctive approaches to prayer.
The practice of Collective Protestant worship raises one final question.
If a Protestant chaplain refuses, on religious grounds, to lead Collective Protestant worship and restricts performance of religious acts to those of the chaplain's own faith group, may the military take such a refusal into account in
evaluating the chaplain's fitness for continued service? The military services
expressly permit chaplains to exercise such objections, so one might assume that
the objections are not prejudicial to the chaplain's career.412 Although the military may take that approach, they are under no obligation to ignore the significance of objections. As noted above, the military decides on accessions (both
into the chaplaincy of the Reserve Components, and also into Active Duty service) based, at least in part, on the specific religious needs of service mem41
bers. 413
If a Protestant chaplain is willing to lead Collective Protestant worship,
he or she will be able to serve a broader range of service members than a chaplain who is willing only to conduct worship for a specific Protestant denomina414
tion. 4 1 The military does not engage in impermissible religious discrimination
if it takes a chaplain's attitude toward Collective Protestant worship into account
so long as the decision is grounded on the underlying justification for the chaplaincy-the accommodation of service members' religious needs.
2.

Prayer at Official Ceremonies

Over the past several years, the practice of public prayer by military
chaplains has attracted more attention and controversy than any other aspect of
the chaplaincy.4 15 Controversy over the practice has focused on the singular
question of whether chaplains may offer sectarian prayers at military ceremonies. More specifically, conservative and evangelical Protestant chaplains assert

supra note 238, at 86-87.

411

HUTCHESON,

412

Chambers, supra note 381, at 86-87.
See Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2007).
Chambers, supra note 381, at 87.
For legal commentary, see generally Dobosh, supra note 4; Rosen, supra note 4, at 1158-64.
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See also, e.g., Neela Bannerjee, Proposalon Military Chaplainsand PrayerHolds Up Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A19; Alan Cooperman, ChaplainsGroup Opposes PrayerOrder; Guarantee on Using Jesus's Name Not Needed, It Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2006, at A4. Controversy over prayer at military ceremonies is not merely a recent phenomena. See Arnold E. Resnicoff, Prayers that Hurt: Public Prayer in Interfaith Settings, MIL. CHAPLAINS' REV. (Winter
1987), http://www.resnicoff.net/prayersthat hurt.htm; Betram Gilbert, On Prayers in Jesus'
Name, MIL. CHAPLAINS' REV. 123 (Fall 1987); LOVELAND, supra note 250, at 307-09 (on disputes
over public prayer in the early 1990s).
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the freedom to pray "in the name of Jesus Christ," regardless of the context in
which the prayer is offered. 1 6
This question has produced an ongoing political and legal battle. In
February 2006, both the Air Force and the Navy issued guidelines that included
restrictions on the use of sectarian language in ceremonial prayer. 4 7 The Air
Force guidelines arose from a broad review of religious practices and policies
originally sparked by allegations of religious intolerance and inappropriate
proselytizing at the Air Force Academy.4 1 8 The guidelines provided the following advice concerning ceremonial prayers:
Public prayer should not imply government endorsement of religion and should not usually be a part of routine business. Mutual respect and common sense should always be applied, including consideration of unusual circumstances and the needs of
the command. Further, non-denominational, inclusive prayer or
a moment of silence may be appropriate for military ceremonies
or events of special importance when its primary purpose is not
the advancement of religious beliefs. Military chaplains are
trained in these matters. 1 9
Later that same month, the Secretary of the Navy issued a new instruction covering a wide range of issues involving religion. This instruction carried
similar advice regarding ceremonial prayer:
In planning command functions, commanders shall determine
whether a religious element is appropriate. In considering the
appropriateness for including a religious element, commanders,
with appropriate advice from a chaplain, should assess the setting and context of the function; the diversity of faith that may
be represented among the participants; and whether the function
is mandatory for all hands. Other than Divine/Religious Services, religious elements for a command function, absent extraordinary circumstances, should be non-sectarian in nature.
Neither the participation of chaplain, nor the inclusion of a reli416

Editorial, We Have a Mess! What Now MCA?, 79 THE Mn..

CHAPLAIN

5, 3 (Sept.-Oct.

2006); Julia Duin, White House to Push Military on Jesus Prayer,WASH. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at
A3; John B. Murdoch & Gary R. Pollitt, Statement on Religious Free Exercise Controversies, 79
THE MIL. CHAPLAIN 1, 3-4 (Jan.-Feb. 2006).
417

U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, GUIDELINES, REVISED INTERIM GUIDELINES CONCERNING FREE

(09 Feb. 2006) [hereinafter AF RI GUIDELINES], availSEC'Y OF NAVY, U.S. DEP'T OF NAVY, INSTR. 1730.7C,
RELIGIOUS MINISTRIES WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (21 Feb. 2006) [hereinafter
SECNAV INSTR. 1730.7C] (rescinded 26 Nov. 2006).
418
See generally, Cook, supra note 4; Schweiker, supra note 4.
419
AF RI GUIDELINES, supra note 417.
EXERCISE OF RELIGION IN THE AIR FORCE

able at www.af.mil/library/guidelines.pdf;
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gious element, in and of themselves, renders a command function a Divine Service or public worship.4 z°
Moreover, the Navy instruction explicitly assigned responsibility to
commanders, rather than chaplains, for the content of ceremonial prayer. The
Navy instruction continued:
Once a commander determines a religious element is appropriate, the chaplain may choose to participate based on his or her
faith constraints. If the chaplain chooses not to participate, he or
she may do so with no adverse consequences. Anyone accepting
a commander's invitation to provide religious elements at a
command function is accountable for following the commander' s guidance.42 '
Opponents of the new policies, both inside and outside the military, focused on both the content restrictions and the allocation of command authority.422 These critics argued that the restrictions on prayer violated the rights of
chaplains by forbidding them from praying in the manner required by their religious beliefs, and by subjecting the content of their prayers to oversight by military superiors. 423 Led by the American Center for Law and Justice, Focus on the
Family and a number of other conservative and evangelical Protestant organiza424
tions, opponents of the policies attracted the attention of federal legislators.
In response to these efforts, a number of influential organizations came
forward to actively support the Air Force and Navy polices. Both the National
Association of Evangelicals and the National Conference on Ministry to the
Armed Forces expressed their approval of inclusive prayer in ceremonial settings.425
Responding favorably to the conservative critique, the House approved
legislation that would have given military chaplains "the prerogative to pray
according to the dictates of the chaplain's own conscience, except as must be
420

SECNAV INSTR. 1730.7C, supra note 417 (rescinded 26 Nov. 2006 by direction of legisla-

tive conferees on Defense appropriations bill). See also Navy Chief of Chaplains, Official Statement on Public Prayer in the Navy (Jan. 2006) [hereinafter OPNAV Statement on Prayer],
http://www.religionandpolicy.org/show.php?p= 1.1.1726&PHPSESSID=4ca36734aeef750435952
c8841 a2ee6e) (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
421

Id.

422

See Alan Cooperman, A Noisy Takeofffor Air Force Guidelines on Religion; Evangelical

Christians Contend Restrictions Imperil Free Exercise, WASH. POST,Oct. 31, 2005, at A20.
423
Id.
424

American Center for Law & Justice, Update on Military Chaplains

& Prayer,

http://www.aclj.org/News/Readwr.aspx?ID=2498 (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
425
The National Association of Evangelicals, Statement on Religious Freedom for Soldiers and
Military Chaplains (Feb. 7, 2006); NCMAF News Release (Feb. 9, 2006). These two groups
represent a wide range of religious bodies that endorse military chaplains.
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limited by military necessity, with any such limitation being imposed in the least
restrictive manner feasible. ' 426 The Senate did not pass such a measure, and the
House provision was dropped in conference over the 2007 Defense Appropriations Act.427 As a compromise between the contending forces, however, the conferees demanded that the Navy and Air Force rescind the policy directives concerning non-sectarian prayer at military ceremonies. 28 In the wake of the legislative conferees' direction to rescind the challenged policies, the Air Force and
Navy reinstated the guidelines on chaplaincy that were in place before the 2006
revisions. 429 The preexisting guidelines do not address the issue of ceremonial
prayer, although a policy letter by the Navy Chief of Chaplains, which contains
essentially the same instructions430
on ceremonial prayer as the rescinded guidelines, still appears to be in effect.

The debate over chaplains' ceremonial prayer raises questions of the
chaplains' asserted right to pray as their faith requires, as well as the potential
Establishment Clause limitations on ceremonial prayers at certain military
events. The context for both inquiries is the same. Military chaplains are regularly asked to provide an invocation or other prayer at a military command
ceremony, such as a "dining in',4 31 or change of command. The ceremony will
usually include service members who are required to attend, and the chaplain
will typically appear in military uniform (rather than worship vestments).43 2
Finally, service regulations provide that chaplains are free to decline, without
prejudice, invitations to pray at military ceremonies,4 33 though most chaplains
acknowledge
experiencing some degree of expectation that they will partici434
pate.
426

H.R. 5122, Sec. 590(a).

427

See Howard M. Friedman, Compromise on Chaplains in Defense AppropriationsAct, (Oct.

2, 2006), http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2006/10/compromise-on-chaplains-in-defense.htm.
See also Neela Bannerjee, Chaplain Prayer Provision Cut From Military Spending Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at Al.

428
429

Conference Report, DW 110-H590-Military Chaplains (Sept. 25, 2006).
SECNAV INSTR. 1730.7B, supra note 219 (Navy policy reinstated Nov. 26, 2006); AF

PoucY DIR. 52-1, supra note 10 (Air Force policy reinstated Oct. 2, 2006).
430 OPNAV Statement on Prayer, supra note 420.
431 A "dining in" ceremony is a formal (and highly ritualized) dinner of the military unit. See
United States Military Academy,
Guide to Military Dining-In, available at
http://www.usma.edu/Protocol/images/DiningInOutGUIDE.pdf.
432 AR 165-1, supra note 10, at sec. 4-4.d. (chaplains may wear religious vestments for worship
services, but while otherwise on duty wear the military uniform; "chaplains scarf, stole, or tallit"
are permitted in addition to the uniform). See also Dobosh, supra note 4, at 1532-34 (on mandatory attendance at military formations).
433 AR 165-1, supra note 10, at sec. 4-4.h. ("Military and patriotic ceremonies may require a
chaplain to provide an invocation, reading, prayer, or benediction. Such occasions are not considered to be religious services. Chaplains will not be required to offer a prayer, if doing so would be
in variance with the tenets or practices of their faith group.").
434 Wildhack, supra note 4, at 245-46 & nn. 186-87.
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On the question of a chaplain's right to pray "according to the dictates
of the chaplain's own conscience" as part of a military ceremony to which the
chaplain has been invited, proponents of such a right have invoked a variety of
different legal bases. These include the chaplain's constitutional or statutory
rights to free exercise of religion and free speech; 435 the regulatory or statutory
provisions that authorize chaplains "to conduct rites, sacraments, and services as
required by their respective denominations;,,436 and asserted Establishment
Clause limits on governmental endorsement of a theological position-in this
case, the position associated with a requirement that ceremonial prayer be nonsectarian.437
With respect to the constitutional or statutory rights of expression and
religious exercise, proponents of unrestricted prayer at ceremonies contend that
the proposed policies reflect content-based regulation of speech and impose a
substantial burden on chaplains' freedom to pray in their chosen manner. None
of the proponents' arguments is persuasive. The free speech claim founders on
the Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos,438 discussed above, which
held that government employees do not enjoy constitutional protection for jobrelated expression in the course of their employment. 439 The only way that
chaplains could avoid the implications of Garcetti would be to argue that ceremonial prayer is an act of private speech, but such a claim cannot be sustained
in this context. 440 The chaplain is invited to pray precisely because of the chaplain's official position, and the chaplain participates because such acts are
deemed part of the chaplain's official role within the military. 44 1 While there
are settings in which it might be reasonable to claim that a speaker invited to
pray at a ceremonial function does so as a private individual, and thus enjoys
some protection for the content of that prayer, 442 the ceremonial prayers of military chaplains possess none of those characteristics.
435

Arthur Schulcz, Blow the Trumpet in Zion, INT'L CONFERENCE OF EVANGELICAL CHRISTIAN

ENDORSERS NEWSLETrER, Oct. 2006, at 3-5; Dobosh, supra note 4, at 1541-49.
436
AR 165-1, supra note 10, at sec. 4-4.e. The chaplains' lawyers have not

pressed this argu-

ment in their written efforts on the subject. We surmise that they do not rely heavily on this provision because military ceremonies are not "rites, sacraments, or services" within its meaning.
437 Schulcz, supra note 435, at 3 ("The Navy has established an official Navy religion and
violated the Establishment Clause's mandated government neutrality in the area of religion by
defining 'nonsectarian' prayer as the only acceptable religious speech at Navy functions. The
Establishment Clause forbids government to make pronouncements as to the rightness or wrongness of religious concepts or beliefs unless a religious doctrine dictates a practice clearly at odds
with the norms of American civil society.").
438 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
439 Id. at 1962; see also supra notes 348-61 and accompanying text (discussing Garcetti).
440
But see Schulcz, supra note 435, at 4.
441 See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note 10, at 4.4.h. ("Military and patriotic ceremonies may require
a chaplain to provide an invocation, reading, prayer, or benediction.").
442
The argument would depend on the extent to which the invitation to deliver the prayer-and
the broader context of the ceremony-might be reasonably understood to reflect the preferences
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The most ambitious-but least plausible-argument under the Speech
Clause is that prayer by chaplains at ceremonies must be private speech because
official religious speech at such functions would violate the Establishment
Clause. 443 That argument, however, is completely self-serving and entirely illogical. It is akin to arguing that the display of the Ten Commandments in the
McCreary County Courthouse must represent the private speech of the County
Commissioners because the display would violate the Establishment Clause if it
were attributed to the County." 4 By this logic, all governmental expression in
support of sectarian religion could be redefined as the private speech of some
government official, and therefore be deemed free of Establishment Clause restrictions. There is no reason to expect courts to be persuaded by this sophistry;
the law determines whether or not speech is public or private by looking at the
context in which the speaker operates, not by the completely result-oriented
technique of examining first the constitutional consequence of labeling speech
as public or private.
The free exercise claims of chaplains are no more compelling than the
assertions of free speech rights. Proponents of faith-specific ceremonial prayer
make two different kinds of arguments. One asserts that the restriction on sectarian prayer discriminates against Protestant evangelicals for whom prayer "in
the name of Jesus" is a religious obligation."46 Such a definition of discrimination has no support in constitutional jurisprudence. The restrictions on ceremoof an individual (perhaps a person being honored in retirement) rather than the government. In
Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005), a case involving a challenge to sectarian prayers in the Indiana legislature, appellants have raised the private speech forum argument in
their briefs defending the practice. Hinrichs remains pending on appeal in the 7th Circuit. Religion Clause, 7th Circuit Hears Arguments in Indiana Legislative Prayer Case,
(Sept. 8,
http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2006/o9/7th-circuit-hears-arguments-in-indiana.htm
2006).
443
Schulcz, supra note 435, at 4 ("Religious speech provided at Navy functions must be 'private speech' since the Navy is forbidden from taking an active part in religion or providing its
own religious speech."). Mr. Schulcz represents the plaintiffs in Larsen and other cases involving
evangelical Christians who are suing the Navy with respect to the current policies governing chaplains. Ken Walker, 5th Lawsuit by Navy ChaplainsAdds to DiscriminationCharges, CHRISTIAN
EXAMINER ONLINE (Aug. 2006), http://www.christianexaminer.com/Articles/Articles%2OAugO6
/Art_Aug06.08.html. See also Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2007) (list of
plaintiffs' counsel).
4
See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (invalidating display of Ten
Commandments because it had been undertaken for constitutionally forbidden purposes of promoting religious ideas).
445
For a detailed and nuanced examination of the context of speech by military officials, determining when such speech should be treated as official government speech, see Fitzkee &
Letendre, supra note 4, at 36-43.
446
Id.; Complaint at 33, 43, 111, 118, 112, Klingenschmitt v. Winter, No. 1:106-cv-01832HHK (D.D.C. 2006) [hereinafter Klingenschmitt complaint]; see also Schulcz, supra note 435, at
5. A similar claim has been raised in a recent lawsuit over restrictions on sectarian prayer in a city
council. Turner v. City Council of the City of Fredericksburg (E.D. Va. 2007), available at
http://www.rutherford.org/PDF/turner%20complaint.pdf.
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nial prayer are formally neutral with respect to all denominations. No person
may pray using the distinctive terms of a particular faith group, and especially
the distinctive name for the faith group's understanding of divinity. 447 Muslims,
Jews and Christians of all stripes are equally bound by the regulation. It is undoubtedly true that some find it easier to work within such restrictions, while
others experience the restrictions as unreasonable constraints. The same could
448
be said, however, of the chaplaincy's fundamental expectations of pluralism.
Not all ministers or faith groups are willing to accept the limitations on ministry
imposed by the norm of pluralism, even in its more pragmatic form. Their unwillingness to accept the restrictions of pluralistic ministry does not transform
the chaplaincy's norm into a forbidden discrimination.
The other claim of religious liberty, advanced by the defenders of sectarian prayer at military ceremonies, relies on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). 449 Proponents of this position assert that the restrictions on
ceremonial prayer impose a substantial burden on the religious liberty of chaplains, and that the burden is not justified as the least restrictive means to achieve
a compelling government interest. 450 It is unlikely that a court would find the
restriction on prayer to be a substantial burden on free exercise, because the
military regulations already excuse any chaplain from participating in ceremonial prayers if such prayers are inconsistent with the chaplain's religious beliefs. 451 Such opt-outs have always been deemed a sufficient means for addressing both free exercise and free speech concerns about government-compelled
speech. 452 The only cases in which opt-outs have been found constitutionally
insufficient involve practices that violate the Establishment Clause, such as
prayer in public schools.453
In order to escape the dilemma of preferred opt-outs as a fully sufficient
response to their concerns, those who oppose the restrictions on sectarian prayer
at ceremonies contend that such restrictions violate the Establishment Clause by
creating a preference for nonsectarian religion over sectarian religion.454 Any
SECNAV INSTR. 1730.7C, supra note 417 (rescinded Nov. 26, 2006), at sec. 6(c) ("Other
than Divine/Religious Services, religious elements for a command function, absent extraordinary
circumstances, should be non-sectarian in nature."). See also Dobosh, supra note 4, at 1560 (describing services' public prayer policies).
"8
See supra notes 335-80 and accompanying text (discussing pluralism in the conduct of
military chaplaincy).
449
Klingenschmitt complaint, supra note 446, at V 125-130.
447

450

Id.

See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note 10, at sec. 4.4.e. See also SECNAV INSTR. 1730.7C, supra
note 417, at sec. 6(c) ("Once a commander determines a religious element is appropriate, the
chaplain may choose to participate based on his or her faith constraints. If the chaplain chooses
not to participate, he or she may do so with no adverse consequences.").
452
See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
453
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963).
454
Klingenschmitt complaint, supra note 446,919125-32.
451
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attempt to define prayer along those lines, they argue, reflects governmental
endorsement of a particular version of religious faith.455
This argument is closely related to the claim that ceremonial prayer
must be treated as private speech in order to survive Establishment Clause scrutiny, and the argument suffers from the same fundamental defect. The defect is
evident in proponents' reliance on Lee v. Weisman456 as authority for this argument.457 In Lee, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a practice of nonsectarian prayer at public school graduation ceremonies.4 58 The Court ruled that the
nonsectarian quality of the prayer was irrelevant; any form of governmentsponsored prayer in public schools violates the Establishment Clause. 459 The
decision does not stand for the proposition that nonsectarian and sectarian
prayer are legally indistinguishable in all contexts, and it certainly does not
stand for the proposition that the defect in the practice rested in the school's
failure to label the prayer as private speech. Instead, Lee v. Weisman reflects the
Court's heightened sensitivity about the coercive effect of religious exercises in
public schools. 46 0 Outside that context, many courts have been willing to recognize a distinction between nonsectarian invocations and sectarian prayers, permitting the former but not the latter in public ceremonies. 461 Indeed the Supreme Court's decision in Marsh v. Chambers, which upheld against Establishment Clause challenge the practice of legislative prayer, suggested the impor462
tance of that distinction.
The claim that non-sectarian and sectarian prayer are constitutionally
indistinguishable-that either both are forbidden or both are permitted-ultimately fails for reasons deeply rooted in Establishment Clause norms.
Ceremonial prayer in the military is most persuasively analogized to legislative
prayer, a practice upheld by the Court in Marsh v. Chambers.4 63 In Marsh,
plaintiffs challenged the existence of a paid chaplain for the Nebraska's state
455

Schulcz, supra note 435, at 3-4.

456

505 U.S. 577 (1992).

457

Schulcz, supra note 435, at 3.
505 U.S. at 598-99.

458

459

See id. at 589-90.
Id. at 592. See also Dobosh, supra note 4, at 1508-09 (describing coercion test from Lee v.
Weisman).
461
See Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006) (denial of stay). In denying a petition
to stay an injunction imposed on the Indiana state legislature's practice of prayer, which included
frequent sectarian invocations-and no policy against such invocations-the court drew a sharp
line between sectarian and nonsectarian prayer in the legislative context. Id. at 398-402. The
Rutherford Institute has aggressively advanced this position in its legal advice to local legislatures.
See John Whitehead, Memorandum: Prayer at City Council Meetings: Analysis and Guidelines
(October 2004), http://www.rutherford.org/PDF/10-15_TownCouncil.pdf (last visited Sept. 5,
2007).
462
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983).
463
Id. at 783.
4W
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legislature, and the legislature's practice of opening each day of the session with
a prayer by the chaplain. 464 The Court held that Nebraska's legislative chaplaincy did not violate the Establishment Clause, although the rationale for the
holding is complicated and contested. 465
Much of the Court's opinion in Marsh focused on the long history of the
practice of legislative prayer, which had continued for over a century in Nebraska, tracking a similar pattern which had persisted since the beginning days
of the federal legislature. 6 The Court found that this history suggests that the
drafters of the First Amendment did not regard legislative chaplaincies as religious establishments. 467
The outcome in Marsh did not turn on history alone. The Court identified several features of the prayer - historical and present - that substantially
mitigated concerns about religious establishments. 4 8 First, the Court said that
"the Founding Fathers looked at invocations as 'conduct whose ... effect...
harmonized with the tenets of some or all religions.' The Establishment Clause
does not always bar a state from regulating conduct simply because it 'harmonizes with religious canons."469 Although its explanation is not a model of clarity, the Court appeared to be arguing that legislative prayers should not be
treated as religious activities, but as a solemnizing event that "harmonizes" with
the religious activity of prayer. Second, the Court emphasized that those who
claimed injury from the legislative prayer were adults, and, thus, "presumably
not readily susceptible to 'religious indoctrination.' ' 470 Third, the Court said that
the content of prayer was not material to the constitutionality of the practice
"where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited 47to1 proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or
belief.,
Taken together, these three features suggest the boundaries of the
Court's reliance on history to uphold the practice of legislative prayer. Although lower courts have increasingly wrestled with application of these
boundaries in a variety of legislative settings, from state legislatures to local
school boards, these courts have also recognized that Marsh does not provide
blanket justification for every practice that might be called "legislative
prayer.''472 Context has played an important role in these decisions. Courts
464 Id. at 784-85.
465 See id. at 792-95.
466

Id. at 786-92.

467 Id. at 792.
468

Id. at 793-95.

469

Id. at 792 (citations omitted).

470

Id.
Id. at 794-95.
Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004); Rubin v. City of Burbank, 124

471
472

Cal. Rptr. 2d 867 (Ct. App. 2002).
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have distinguished traditional public legislative assemblies, in which adult participants come and go freely, from settings such as meetings of public school
boards, which schoolchildren may sometimes be required to attend. 473 Courts
have also examined the types of prayer offered, and a number of decisions have
concluded that a pattern of sectarian prayers should be treated differently than
the practice at issue in Marsh.4 74
This twofold concern about context and content guides application of
Marsh to chaplains' prayers at military ceremonies. In sharp contrast to ordinary legislative assemblies, service members are typically commanded to attend
military ceremonies, and, thus, do not have the option of avoiding prayer if they
desire to do SO. 4 75 In this respect, service members more closely approximate
schoolchildren, despite the difference in age.476 The fact that service members
attend ceremonies under orders is also relevant to assessment of the prayers'
content. Marsh suggested that legislative prayers would be constitutionally vulnerable if they were "exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief." 477 A court might be unwilling to treat the simple
coda "in Jesus' name" as exploitative in a legislative setting, where listeners are
at liberty to excuse themselves, but the same phrase might be treated quite differently in prayer before a "captive audience."
The application of Marsh to the context of military ceremonies underscores the implausibility of the claim made by proponents of sectarian prayer
that such prayers are indistinguishable from non-sectarian prayers. That claim
assumes that both sectarian and non-sectarian prayers constitute religious activities. Marsh and its lower court progeny, however, depend on the finding that, at
least in some circumstances, prayers are not religious activities but secular activities that "harmonize" with common religious practices. 78 The three features
identified by the Court in Marsh focus on the extent to which legislative prayer
resembles a religious activity, including the purpose of the prayer's message and
Coles ex rel. Coles v. Tracy, 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999) (striking down school board
prayer); Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 52 F. App'x 355 (9th Cir. 2002)
(unpublished order) (striking down school board prayer).
474
Compare Wynne, 376 F.3d at 292 (striking down practice of sectarian prayer), with Simpson
v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005) (upholding practice of
nonsectarian prayer, but permitting board to deny invitation to Wiccan practitioner because no
general invitation is extended to the public).
475 Dobosh, supra note 4, at 1532-34; Wildhack, supra note 4, at 246.
476
The Court in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992), emphasized the coercive effect of
the prayers, even at a formally optional event like a middle school or high school graduation. The
coercive effect of prayer upon service members compelled to attend a ceremony is obviously
stronger than that involved in Lee. See also Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003)
(enjoining supper prayer at Virginia Military Institute on grounds of its coercive effect on cadets).
See Dobosh, supra note 4, at 1513-17 (discussing Mellen). See also Wildhack, supra note 4, at
245-46 (discussing conduct of chaplains at effectively mandatory events).
477
463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983).
478
See Simpson, 404 F.3d at 282-83 (discussing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792).
473
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the experience of the audience. 479 The more the practice resembles a normal
religious event, the less likely the practice will withstand challenge under the
Establishment Clause. Seen in that light, the practice of sectarian prayer at military ceremonies is far more constitutionally vulnerable than most legislative
prayer.
Even if sectarian prayer at military ceremonies does not represent a
categorical violation of the Establishment Clause, the possibility that it might be
such a violation generates discretionary authority in the military to forbid prayer
of that character. Under Marsh, sectarian prayer that is "exploited to proselytize
or advance any one ...faith or belief"A 80 at ceremonies would violate the Establishment Clause. The concern to guard against violation of that standard would
provide the military with a zone of discretion, in which courts would be highly
unlikely to second-guess determinations of the appropriate content for such
prayers, especially given the "captive audience" for ceremonial prayers in the
military setting.48'
A variety of powerful constitutional themes-the anti-coercion concern
483
expressed in Lee, 48 2 the boundaries of ceremonial prayer suggested in Marsh
and the deference to military authorities with respect to religion as expressed in
Goldman484 -thus coalesce to support a military policy precluding sectarian
prayer at ceremonies. Whatever "burdens" such a preclusion may impose on the
religious liberty interests of chaplains, anti-coercion concerns for service members in attendance and respect for Establishment Clause norms amply satisfy
RFRA's requirement of compelling interests as well as any constitutionallybased requirement to justify such a preclusion.485
In addition, the policy of "minimal religious pluralism," discussed
above, provides yet one more reason to restrict sectarian prayer in ceremonial
settings which service members are obliged to attend.486 Indeed, all the arguments for minimal pluralism, and against a theory of chaplains' rights that
would undercut such pluralism, are far stronger in the setting of ceremonial
prayer than in the context of worship services. For that reason, the suggestion
479 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786, 790-92 (emphasizing traditional and ceremonial attributes of prac-

tice, and stressing absence of proof that prayers were "exploited" to advance particular religious
beliefs).
480

Id. at 792.

481

See Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11, 25-30 (D.D.C. 2007) (invoking deferential

standard from Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), to assess constitutional claims raised
by chaplains).
482
See generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
483
See generally Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783.
484 See generally Goldman, 475 U.S. 503.
485
See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 730 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (government has
a compelling interest in avoiding Establishment Clause violations) (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 271 (1981)).
486
See supra notes 362-68 and accompanying text (discussing minimal pluralism).
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that the problem of sectarian prayer can be solved by permitting service members who object to such prayer to "opt-out" of the relevant ceremonies seems
profoundly misplaced. The military inevitably must choose between chaplains'
interests to pray as they choose in official ceremonies and service members'
rights to not be driven from those ceremonies by hostile or alienating religious
sentiments. Along with considerations of law, the concern for religious pluralism and the accompanying spirit of unity that the military seeks to inspire
4 87 point
settings.
these
in
prayer
sectarian
on
restriction
a
of
favor
in
strenuously
3.

Pastoral Care

Issues of religious discrimination, pluralism and sectarian public prayers
have captured significant public attention, but the practice of pastoral care by
military chaplains might prove to be even more constitutionally sensitive and
complex.48 8 Pastoral care encompasses a broad range of encounters between
clergy and others, and these encounters may occur in an equally broad range of
settings.489 Chaplains visit the sick or injured in hospitals, engage in formal
counseling sessions with service members and their families, hear private confession from congregants, talk informally with soldiers as they ride along on a
convoy or share a meal at a forward operating base, or sit with a colleague over
coffee in a headquarters office building.
The diverse contexts of pastoral care give rise to the constitutional complexity of the practice because a model of such care appropriate in one setting
may be legally problematic in another. Consider two common occasions for
pastoral care. In the first, a service member visits the post chapel on a large
domestic installation and makes an appointment with a specific chaplain, one of
six clergy of different and clearly identified faiths on the chapel staff. In the
second, a military hospital chaplain visits the room of an injured service member to determine the patient's religious needs. Under normal circumstances, the
first chaplain can reasonably assume that the service member scheduled the appointment because of the chaplain's distinctive religious commitments. The
chaplain's care might involve religious instruction and-if the service member
did not share the chaplain's faith, or did not embrace it with full intensity-perhaps even efforts at religious persuasion. Such a robust religious encounter between chaplain and service member fits perfectly within the model of
religious accommodation. The service member selected this particular opportuSee Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 4, at 5-6; Wildhack, supra note 4, at 247, 247 n. 199 (on
unit cohesion).
488
See HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 62-64.
489
The armed services include a range of pastoral care tasks within the specified duties of
487

chaplains. AF INSTR. 52-101, supra note 253, at sec. 4; AR 165-1, supra note 10, at sec. 4-4.k.;
OPNAV INSTR. 1730.1D, supra note 10, at sec. 5.b.(4). On pastoral care more generally, see
HOWARD JOHN CLINEBELL, BASIC TYPES OF PASTORAL CARE AND COUNSELING: RESOURCES FOR
THE MINISTRY OF HEALING AND GROWTH (Abingdon Press 1984).
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nity for religious experience from a menu of choices, and did so in a context that
appears to minimize the risk of exploitation.
In the second context, however, the model of robust religious encounter
sits uneasily with the constitutional structure of religious accommodation. The
injured service member is not likely to have selected this particular chaplain,
and the hospital setting suggests the possibility that the service member might
be especially vulnerable to attempts at religious indoctrination or influence. In
this context, the military must require chaplains to adopt a model of pastoral
care that affords heightened protection for the service member. Such a model,
reflected in the standards for Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE), emphasizes the
responsive character of pastoral care. 490 The chaplain elicits and develops the
patient's own religious commitments, rather than imposing on the patient the
religious views of the chaplain.
Indeed, every court that has considered a constitutional challenge to a
hospital chaplaincy program has approved of the CPE model of responsive care
and has suggested the constitutional infirmity of a model that would permit
proselytizing by chaplains. In Baz v. Walters,49 1 the Seventh Circuit rejected an
employment discrimination claim brought by a former chaplain in the Veterans
Administration hospital system.492 The chaplain claimed, among other things,
that the hospital dismissed him from his position because he refused, on religious grounds, to conform to the "institutional theology" of pastoral care established by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).49 ' This institutional theology, he argued, prohibited him from engaging in the explicitly evangelical outreach to patients that his faith required.494 The court rejected his claim and said
that the VA's restrictions on his chaplaincy were constitutionally required:
[Tihe V.A. must ensure that the existence of the chaplaincy
does not create establishment clause problems. Unleashing a
government-paid chaplain who sees his primary role as proselytizing upon a captive audience of patients could do exactly that.
The V.A. has established rules and regulations to ensure that
those patients who do not wish to entertain a chaplain's ministry
need not be exposed to it. Far from defining its own institutional theology, the medical and religious staffs at Danville are

490
See Carter v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 667 F. Supp. 1269, 1272-73 (S.D. Iowa 1987), aff'd in
part, modified in part, 857 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1988) (describing CPE model of pastoral care). See
also Freedom from Religion Found. v. Nicholson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 609, 612-13 (W.D. Wis. 2007)
(describing CPE model); HUTCHESON, supra note 238, at 63-64 (CPE and military chaplaincy).
491
782 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1986).
492
Id. at 709.
493

Id.

494

Id. at 705, 709.
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merely attempting to walk a fine constitutional line while safeguarding the health and well-being of the patients.49 5
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center,4 96 which involved an Establishment Clause challenge to
a public hospital chaplaincy program.49 7 The court ruled that the chaplaincy

program did not violate the Establishment Clause because the chaplain's role
was designed to accommodate the religious needs of hospital patients and their
families.49 8 In reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized the CPE model of
pastoral care in which "the religious content in [the chaplain's] services to a
patient depended entirely on the patient's pre-existing preferences." 99 The
court also stressed the important role played by the paid chaplain in "supervis[ing] the volunteer chaplains to make sure they abide by the nonproselytization principles of C.P.E. ' '5°°
Most recently, in Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Nicholson,50 1 a
federal district court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the VA
healthcare chaplaincy program. 0 2 The complaint alleged that the VA unconstitutionally integrates religion into all aspects of its healthcare, and that it does so
through the chaplaincy's systematic engagement with each patient admitted to
the hospital system. 50 3 The court dismissed the lawsuit because it determined
that the chaplaincy program represented a constitutionally legitimate accommodation of the free exercise needs of patients in VA facilities.50 4 As in Baz and
Carter, the court emphasized the structure and limitations of the CPE model
chaplaincy and found the VA's embrace of that model to be constitutionally
dispositive. 50 5 CPE-trained chaplains, the court found, assist patients to develop
the patients' own religious beliefs and spiritual resources rather than "initiating
or guiding religious instruction. '' 506 Moreover, the VA's CPE-trained chaplains
"are proactive in eliminating proselytizing from their hospitals. As such, VA
50 7
pastoral care is religious in content only if that is the wish of a given patient.,

498

Id. at 709.
857 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 450.
Id. at 456-57.

499

Id. at 455.

500

Id. at 456.

495
496
497

469 F. Supp. 2d 609 (W.D. Wis. 2007). See our analysis of this decision at the RT website:
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legallegal-update-display.cfm?id=55.
502
Nicholson, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 621-22.
501

503
504

505
506
507

Id. at 612-16.
Id. at 619-23.
Id.. at 621-23.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 613, 622-23.
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These first two settings of pastoral care-the large base chapel and the
military hospital-represent opposite ends of a spectrum, with maximal religious choice and minimal vulnerability at one end, and minimal choice and
heightened vulnerability at the other. Between these two poles, however, lie
much more difficult questions about the practice of pastoral care. Consider two
additional and equally common situations. In the third, a service member and
her husband, who are having marital difficulties, visit the base Family Life Center, which offers trained pastoral counseling and support groups. 50 8 The service
member's unit commander suggested that she seek help from the Center because
her family trouble was interfering with her work. In the fourth, a service member seeks the counsel of his unit chaplain who is deployed with the unit in a
remote operating base in Iraq.
The third setting-the Family Life Center-offers a number of features
found in each of the first two settings. On the one hand, the service member
visits the pastoral counselor voluntarily, and we might reasonably presume that
other opportunities or resources for marital counseling are available within the
community. On the other hand, the Center may hold itself out as a religiously
inclusive service provider more akin to a healthcare facility than a chapel, and
so the service member's encounter with a particular chaplain should not be
taken as acceptance of religious content that chaplain might offer. Moreover,
the specific need for counseling-especially on recommendation of a superior
-might indicate some degree of vulnerability to religious influence, though
perhaps not to the extent present in the hospital setting.
We would expect a military pastoral counseling center to resolve this
uncertainty through specific guidance for chaplains on the content of their care.
Such guidance might include formal agreements with potential clients about the
character and extent of religious language and commitments in the counseling
sessions, or other mechanisms to ensure that clients directed the religious content. Within the constitutional framework of accommodation, even thickly religious counseling may be appropriate so long as the recipients of such counseling have given meaningful consent to receiving it.
The fourth setting shares the ambiguities present in the third, although
in a significantly different context. As in the first example, the service member
visits the chaplain voluntarily with full awareness of the chaplain's religious
identity. However, the parallels with the first example end at that point. In a
remote area, the service member who wishes to confide in a chaplain is not
likely to have a great deal of choice; unless he waits for the occasional visit of
clergy of different faiths to provide formal worship, the service member will
have contact only with the unit's assigned chaplain. 50 9 The service member, of
508

For an example of programs at one such facility, see the website for the Fort Wainwright

Chaplain Family Life Center: http://www.wainwright.army.mi/FWAFLC/.
509
See generally Kristin Henderson, Chaplains at War, WASH. POST MAG. (April 30, 2006), at
W04 (describing daily life for deployed chaplains in Iraq). See also Gregory J. Darr, For God &
Country: The Constitutional Question of the U.S. Army Chaplaincy, MIL. CHAPLAINS' REv. 95,
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course, may happen to share that chaplain's faith tradition, in which case this
setting more closely approximates the first. It is more likely, however, that the
service member and chaplain will not be of the same faith group. 510 The special
vulnerability associated with likely exposure to combat magnifies concern for
the service member, and brings this setting closer to that of chaplaincy in a hospital environment.
Moreover, in contrast to the first three settings, this one presents a special challenge because of the difficulty of formalizing or monitoring the relationship between chaplain and service member. The relationship may have preexisted the situation of danger, but it may well have arisen swiftly in contemplation of that danger, and it may take place in a hurried and completely unsupervisable setting.
The fourth setting accordingly presents a unique and excruciating constitutional dilemma. The temporal and spatial likelihood of grave physical danger, the absence of a service member's choice of particular faith affiliation on
the part of the chaplain, and the lack of formal supervision cumulatively present
a significant risk of unwanted religious persuasion in this context. At the same
time, however, some service members in this situation may experience a longing, however articulated, for explicit, detailed religious inspiration and support.
Faced with this dilemma, a military that imposed an outright ban on religious
persuasion by chaplains in this setting would protect vulnerable service members from exploitation while simultaneously undermining the religious options
of service members seeking deep and sustained religious counsel at a moment of
personal truth.
In light of the constitutional sensitivities at either pole of this problem, it
is both remarkable and disquieting that the armed forces currently provide no
meaningful guidance to chaplains on how to respond in this context of pastoral
care. A chaplain in a deployed setting would violate no current military chaplaincy regulations by offering aggressive religious counsel, including explicit
efforts at conversion or inculcation of particular religious views, to troops who
sought pastoral care, even though such proselytizing is clearly prohibited by the
standards of CPE practice, and seems to be a condition of the constitutionality
of healthcare chaplaincy programs.5 11
The military's failure to adopt guidelines for pastoral care is understandable in political terms, given the turmoil occasioned by the services' promulgation of rules governing sectarian prayer at military ceremonies. 1 2 Some
chaplains' endorsing organizations and political groups, arguing that proselytiz101-02 (Winter 1992) (on forward deployment of Army chaplains); HUTCHESON, supra note 238,
at 84-85 (provision of chaplains in smaller units).
510
Phillips, supra note 239, at 4-5.
511
See supra notes 490-507 and accompanying text (discussing decisions involving public
healthcare chaplaincy programs).
512
See supra notes 415-30 and accompanying text (discussing furor over Air Force and Navy
proposals to prohibit sectarian prayer at military ceremonies).
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ing is an essential part of their religious ministry, would inevitably attack any
rule that prohibited or limited chaplains from using aggressive religious persuasion in these situations. 13
But the strategy of avoidance in this context is not constitutionally defensible. In contrast to ceremonial prayer, which always occurs in the openness
of public gatherings, the practice of pastoral care takes place in private, and often in situations of great emotional and spiritual distress. That distress renders
those who seek pastoral care vulnerable to undue influence or even exploitation.
In such circumstances, the issuance of constitutionally appropriate
guidelines would be salutary. A set of adequate guidelines would explicitly
recognize the dilemma presented by pastoral care on the battlefield, and recognize as well the inevitably interactive quality of pastoral counseling in that setting. A service member seeking a bit of religious guidance may end up getting
far more than he bargained for, while others may be ill-served by a chaplain's
reticence to fully engage the religious dimensions of the moment. Pastoral care
by military chaplains is justified as a religious accommodation for the needs of
service members, but the administration of that practice must be responsive to
those needs-including needs borne of their particular vulnerability in the very
settings that call for the existence of the chaplaincy. At the very least, the military should prohibit pro-active, chaplain-initiated religious persuasion by chaplains in any context in which service members might be regarded as both vulnerable and deprived of adequate choice of religious confidant.51 4 As in the
CPE model of pastoral care, the structure of accommodation demands a carefully calibrated degree of reticence on the part of chaplains. They may share
their own faith if invited by the service member, but pastoral care should not be
seen as an opportunity to evangelize. Pastoral care, like other aspects of the
military chaplaincy, exists for the purpose of serving the religious needs of service members as those needs are expressed by the service members themselves.
Guidelines and training for pastoral care at the frontier of danger should
thus explicitly point chaplains and their supervisors in the direction of sensitive
appraisal of a service member's religious background and self-articulated spiritual needs. Under such a regime, which neither banned nor explicitly invited
The arguments made in defense of sectarian prayer at military ceremonies would apply with
equal-and perhaps even greater-force to the context of pastoral care. Although public invocations at official ceremonies may plausibly be construed as "secular" acts, the conduct of pastoral
care resists any such construal. The "pastoral" quality of a chaplain's counsel reflects its religious
character, which distinguishes the care from standard secular counseling or therapy. Mandatory
embrace of the CPE model's religious pluralism would seem to reflect even more an "establishment" of a particular religious view, and constraint on chaplains' religious liberty, than the brief
non-sectarian prayers of military ceremonies. Nonetheless, the arguments offered by opponents of
the CPE model are unlikely to be any more successful than opponents of CPE in the healthcare
chaplaincy context, or than the opponents of the services' policies for public prayer.
514
In Katcoff v. Marsh, the court accepts and relies on the military's representation that proselytizing is prohibited, though such a prohibition is not clearly reflected in any military regulation.
755 F.2d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 1985).
513
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religious persuasion, service members would be neither deprived of desired religious support nor exploited at a moment of maximum physical and spiritual
vulnerability. Instead, chaplains would be instructed to put the religious needs
and desires of service members, rather than the chaplain's own view of the path
to salvation, at the forefront of the mission of pastoral care. As we see it, this is
a generic norm in the context of pastoral care, but it has acute and special force
on the battlefield.
VI. CONCLUSION

At the outset of this paper, we suggested that the multiplicity of Establishment Clause tests and standards had led many courts and commentators
astray in their approach to the military chaplaincy. As time and circumstances
have repeatedly revealed, the law of the Establishment Clause cannot be boiled
down to a single test or standard. Instead, the Supreme Court's decisions in the
field cluster around a set of such tests or standards, each appropriate to its own
particular context.
The military chaplaincy can best be appraised through the legal prism of
permissive accommodation. When the institution is so viewed, its basic features
appear to fit comfortably within our constitutional tradition. Various aspects of
the institution, however, require close and careful consideration of a variety of
constitutional and statutory concerns. These concerns do not always point in the
same direction. We remain convinced, however, that both the overarching and
particularistic evaluation of the chaplaincy can be accomplished effectively only
within the framework of permissive accommodation of religion, and with the
regard for military judgment that follows from application of that framework.
As is true of much of military life, the interests of individuals must be
frequently subordinated to overarching concerns of the armed forces as an institution. Thus, many-though not all-complaints by chaplains about restrictions
on the time, place, or content or their religious expression are without merit.
The individuals whose interests are to be preserved in the context of the chaplaincy are those service members whose religious experience depends on a vibrant, yet appropriately obedient, corps of chaplains.
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